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In 1992, the NBC program "Dateline" broadcast a story about children
working in Bangladeshi garment factories that sold products to Wal-Mart.'
Children as young as eleven years old were sewing Wal-Mart products in
these factories.2 Two years previously, a fire in one of the factories had
killed twenty-five workers, including several children?
1. Thomas C. Hayes, Wal-Mart DisputesReport on Labor,N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 24, 1992, at
D3 (regarding "Dateline," an NBC television broadcast, Dec. 22, 1992).
2. Id.
3. Id There were no child labor laws in Bangladesh at that time. Id.
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At that time, Wal-Mart had contracted with third-party suppliers
located throughout the world, including in Bangladesh, for the manufacture
of its products.4 The evidence suggests that, embarrassed by the broadcast
in the United States, Wal-Mart began cancelling its agreements with
Bangladeshi suppliers.5 Other retailers similarly cancelled contracts with
their suppliers, complaining that the bad publicity was adversely affecting
business.6 The multinationals 7 ultimately adopted codes of conduct
imposing minimum standards of conduct on the remaining suppliers!
Meanwhile, the Bangladeshi Garment Manufacturers and Exporters
Association (BGMEA) learned that proposed legislation before the United
States Congress would ban importation into the United States of garments
manufactured with child labor.9 The concern of the BGMEA was
heightened by the fact that garment exports represented the single largest
export industry of Bangladesh and that more than half of these goods were
exported to the United States."° In July 1994, the BGMEA announced that

4. Wal-Mart is a virtual organization. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
5. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS,
THE APPAREL INDUSTRY AND CODES OF CONDUcT: A SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CHILD

LABOR PROBLEM? 7 (1996), with duplicate title page dated 1998, availableat http://www.dol.gov
/dollilab/public/libraiy/reportsliclp/apparellapparel.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2001) [hereinafter
ILAB/DOL].
6. Id.

7. Multinational corporations are sometimes considered more centered in a particular state
than are transnational corporations. Eg., David Jacobson, New BorderCustoms: Migrationandthe
Changing Role of the State, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 443, 449 (1999). Far more
frequently, the terms are used as synonyms. Eg., David Katona, Note, Challengingthe Global
Structure Through Self-Determination:An African Perspective, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1439,
1447 (1999); Kojo Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies for Foreign Direct Investment:
Alternatives to Tax Incentive Policies, 7Nw.J. INT'LL. & BUS. 208, 209 n.1, 210 n.2, 247 n.150

(1986). 1use the terms "multinational enterprise" or"multinational" interchangeably and make no
effort to distinguish them from transnational corporations.
8. For codes of conduct of three major multinational enterprises based in the United States,
in the form current in 1996, shortly after the publicity began to have an impact, see, e.g.,
ILAB/DOL,supra note 5, at200 (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Standards for Vendor Partners); id.at 165
(Nike Code of Conduct); id at 155 (Levi Strauss & Co. Global Sourcing &Operating Guidelines).
In 1991, Levi Strauss was the first multinational enterprise to write a code of conduct. Levi Strauss
& Co., Social Responsibility, Sourcing Guidelines, at (2001) http://www.levistrauss.com
/responsibility/conduct/ [hereinafter Levi Strauss Sourcing Guidelines];see also,CitizenShell,N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997, at A14. Nike first adopted its code of conduct in 1992. Nike Employing
Andrew Young, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1997, at D2.
9. ILAB/DOL, supra note 5, at 7. The bill was not passed, but there was partial enactment
in 1999, when President Clinton issued an executive order essentially prohibiting procurement by
the United States government of goods produced by "forced or indentured child labor." Exec. Order
No. 13126, 64 Fed. Reg. 32, 383 (June 12, 1989) (defining a child as under 18 years of age). In
1999, the idea reappeared in congressional legislation, but the bill did not pass. S.373,106th Cong.
§ 2 (1999).
10. ILAB/DOL, supra note 5, at 7.
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the use of child labor would cease after October 1994, a mere three months
later.'
At first blush, this appears to be a story about the might of the Western
economy brought to bear in favor of human rights, particularly those of
children. Available information indeed confirms that, after October 1994,
significantly fewer children were working in factories manufacturing
exports.' 2However, the story is more complicated; the dismissed children
did not merely retire to go to school. 3 Thousands of children were fired
between July and October of 1994, and the evidence reflects that these
children found newjobs, working 1for
underground subcontractors, or even
4
working as beggars or prostitutes.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Wal-Mart/Bangladesh event was not an isolated occurrence;
although multinationals have adopted codes of conduct, 5 developingcountry workers today continue to suffer the consequences of the
multinationals' power.'6 If the developing-country workers could have
made themselves heard, the multinationals might well not have acted
unilaterally. If Wal-Mart had listened to Bangladeshi child workers and
their families instead of acting precipitously, it might have averted the
devastating consequences of its actions.
In order to teach multinationals to listen, I propose to frame appropriate
behavior in terms familiar to multinationals; they should extend to workers
the legal norm of good faith ubiquitous in the commercial realm. Further,
in order to make the extension more palatable, the multinationals should
be encouraged to see that they can actually benefit from the extension of
this familiar norm. I recommend the use of a supranational structure
modeled on 7the International Labor Organization to reinforce consultation
of workers.'
11. Id.
12. Id
13. Reports indicate that Bangladesh was not making available schooling orsimilarprograms.
Id. Since that time, the BGMEA, the International Labor Organization (ILO), and UNICEF have
entered into a memorandum of understanding providing, inter alia, for the opening of schools. Id
14. Id
15. See supranote 8 (citing codes of conduct adopted).
16. E.g., Group Links Pentagon, Firms to ChildLabor,WASH. POST, Dec. 22,2000, at A9
(reporting accusations that Nike, Sharper Image, and Kohl's sell goods produced overseas under
abusive working conditions and the companies' assertions that the conditions are appropriate to the
region); see also Stephanie Strom, A SweetheartBecomes Suspect: Looking Behind Those Kathie
Lee Labels, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1996, at D1 (reporting that in 1996 Wal-Mart was again
responsible for marketing clothes manufactured by children, this time by 13- and 14-year-old
Hondurans).
17. Existing pressure even from supranational organizations has proven inadequate, as
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I am not suggesting that the supranational organization be an enforcer.
Enforcement can be an effective tool to implement a value, 8 but hastening
to enforce may result in premature implementation, as was the case in the
Wal-Mart/Bangladesh example. In contrast, an iterative process of norm
formation more reminiscent of education than enforcement invites even the
relatively vulnerable workers to express their needs and concerns.' 9
Extending the good faith norm replicates the educative rather than punitive
content of law.
There are many, high hurdles in teaching multinationals to listen. The
next -section, Part H, describes how the organizational form of major
multinationals, the virtual organization, increases the likelihood that the
multinational will abuse its workers. This organizational form presupposes
the multinational's power over its subcontractors and their workers and
thus enhances the psychological distance between the multinational and the

developing-country workers. The form consequently increases the
likelihood that the multinational will impose standards without consulting
the workers. In the language of the universalism-relativism debate, familiar
both to the philosophic foundations of sociology and to international law,
the multinational imposes a universalist value from the developed world
onto the developing-country workers.20 Thus, whatever the standard, Wal-

continuing abuses attest. See supra note 16 (documenting continuing abuses); infra note 84
(presenting examples of initiatives from three supranational organizations: the ILO, the United
Nations (UN), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)).
Reaction to a recent UN effort was promptly challenged as window-dressing by activists. Joseph
Kahn, Multinationals Sign UN. Pact on Rights and Environment, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,2000, at
A3 (reporting criticism describing the "Global Compact" as a "bluewash," wrapping undeserving
multinationals in the blue flag of the UN). Generally speaking, a successful supranational
organization could be considered a "norm entrepreneur." Cass R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation,
Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1193-94 (1996) (describing
official institutions, such as the Supreme Court, as well as private individuals as norm
entrepreneurs).
18. Janelle M. Diller & David A. Levy, Note, Child Labor, Trade and Investment: Toward
the Harmonization of International Law, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 663, 664, 694-95 (1997); see also
Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection ofWorkers'Rights, 3 J. SMALL
& EMERGINo BUs. L. 131,167-68 (1999) (discussing the possibility ofenforcement of fundamental
labor rights by the World Trade Organization (WTO) or even the ILO).
19. See infra Part IV.A. (regarding the involvement of all participants); JOHN C. TURNER,
SOCIAL INFLUENCE 4-5 (1991) (regarding the pressure to conform, and noting that it is only in the
absence of force that mere compliance can be avoided).
20. There is an increasing effort to include the human rights perspective in the discussion of
labor conditions. See, e.g., Katherine E. Cox, Should Amnesty International ExpandIts Mandate
to Cover Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights?, 14 ARIz. J. INT'L L. 261,271 (1999) (referring
to labor conditions). That is a potentially fruitful avenue because values inhabit the human rights
perspective. Paul W. Kahn, American Hegemony and International Law Speaking Law to Power:
Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International Order, I CEl. J. INT'L L. 1, 13, 15
(2000) (treating human rights as values). However, because this Article is starting from an
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Mart's application of that universalist value in Bangladesh harmed the
workers. The corrective, inspired by relativism's focus on local culture,
emphasizes that the multinationals must learn to listen. It requires the
multinational to engage the developing-country workers in dialogue, at
least regarding the method of implementation. The good faith norm
represents the best, least-coercive tool to reconcile the legitimate interests
of both the multinationals and the employees of their suppliers.
Part III concludes that existing extralegal incentives are insufficient to
establish that dialogue, as the continued abuse ofworkers proves. This Part
looks first at the good faith norm as a micro, private-level incentive, but
notes that, while this norm is applicable to multinationals both in
transnational and in domestic commercial transactions, it has not in fact
been extended to benefit workers. Macro, societal-level, incentives have
been no more successful; despite the multinationals' extant overcapacity,
the fact that developing-country workers are potential customers has not
caused the multinationals to consult their workers. And, as the WalMart/Bangladesh debacle illustrates, the power of the multinationals'
developed-country customers has resulted in harm to, not consultation
with, developing-country workers. The workers need support from more
than these extralegal incentives before the multinational establishes a
dialogue with them.
Part IV first recognizes the difficulty of creating a consultative norm;
it acknowledges the difficulty of extending to workers even the familiar
good faith norm. Critical to success is first to frame the extension as a
benefit for the multinationals and then to apply consistent and persistent
pressure on them. After providing the vocabulary necessary to discuss
various structural alternatives, I propose a top-down, supranational
structure based on the experience of the International Labor Organization.
This structure supports the development ofworker-multinational dialogue
by helping extend to workers an enhanced version of the good faith norm
already practiced by multinationals among themselves.
II. THE MULTINATIONALS' POWER OVER AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
DISTANCE FROM WORKERS EMPHASIZES A UNIVERSALIST APPROACH
The Wal-Mart/Bangladesh example illustrates the impact ofa powerful
but distant actor. Whether the value underlying Wal-Mart's behavior was
self-preservation or a revulsion against child labor,2 the multinational in

inherently commercial perspective, rather than a human rights perspective, I will start with values
that the dominant players have been using among themselves. The reason is to avoid the unilateral
imposition ofvalues from outside the commercial community-the ultimate "top-down" approach.
21. There is evidence that multinationals possess a cynical instinct for self-preservation. See,
e.g., Hayes, supra note I (reporting that Wal-Mart fired a Hong-Kong supplier aflerNBC reported

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol53/iss4/1
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1992 acted demonstrably without focusing on the developing-country
workers. Neither value can by itself harm workers, but either value
implemented with Wal-Mart's 1992 haste can result in mass dismissals.
Multinationals cannot be left to implement codes of conduct unilaterally
because the very structure of the modem business form enhances and
encourages, at best, indifference to the impact on workers, and, at worst,
ruthlessness.
A The Modern Vehicle for TransnationalCommerci-' TransactionsIs
Based on PowerDisparityand CreatesPsychologicalDistance
What is this business structure that emphasizes the "otherness" 22 of
developing-country workers?
1. The Multinational as Virtual Organization
Today the virtual organizationP is the business form much in vogue.24
Major retailers such as Wal-Mart and other types of multinationals,
including manufacturers such as Nike,2' are virtual organizations.
A virtual organization is a hub linked by contract to its spokes, the
suppliers.26 It is a business whose hub has outsourced, or contracted out,

that the supplier was using false place-of-origin labels in order to avoid United States quotas).
However, that is not the only possible explanation for their actions in Bangladesh; perhaps the
multinationals truly supported an anti-child-labor value and sought to reduce child labor. Whatever
the motivation, the Bangladeshi child workers suffered; the explanation is irrelevant to them. The
motivation matters to this Article, however, because it will be more difficult to modify the
multinationals' behavior so as to protect workers if the multinationals are focused on their own
developed-country customers and not on the developing-country workers. By adopting the cynical
interpretation, I thus assume the facts that maximize the difficulty of breaking the template.
22. This term is used in the critical literature. See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hernndez-Truyol,
Borders (En)gendered: Normativities,Latinas, anda LatCritParadigm,72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 882,
892 (1997) (discussing multiple "otherness"); Leon E. Trakman, Native Cultures in a Rights
Empire Ending the Dominion,45 BUFF. L. REV.189, 204 (1997) (discussing cultural othemess).
23. See generally Claire Moore Dickerson, Spinning Out of Control: The Virtual
Organization and Conflicting Governance Vectors, 59 U. PrIT. L. REV. 759, 761-69 (1998)
(defining the virtual organization). I prefer the term "virtual organization" to "virtual corporation"
because the formal structure used by the hub can be other than a corporation. See infranote 26 and
accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., WILLIAMH.DAVIDOW&MICHAELS.MALONE, THEVIRTUALCORPORATION 19
(1992).
25. See Adrian J. Slywotzky, TakingtheLow Road,SALES&MARKETINGMGMT., Jan. 1996,
at 53, 55-60 (noting that Wal-Mart's customers' income is sufficiently limited that Wal-Mart is able
to increase their discretionary savings by between 30% and 50%); Mike Troy, Sporting Goods
Industry Split on Power,Timing ofE-Commerce, DISCOUNT STORE NEWS, May 24, 1999, at 17
(Although commercial retailers were unenthusiastic, Nike has opened its own "NikeTown" outlets
and offered products through its web site.).
26. DAVIDOW & MALONE, supra note 24, at 5-6 (describing a virtual organization as a
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all but the company's "core competencies."27 Nike, for example, has
concluded that the "design, marketing and technology of footwear and
apparel" are its core competencies, and that it should outsource
manufacturing. 2 Almost all personnel physically in the "Nike Factories"
are employees of the suppliers; the only Nike employees located in those
suppliers' factories are its quality control specialists.29 Nike is the
cerebrum engaged exclusively in higher brain function.30
The articulated purposes for the contractual nature of the relationship
between the virtual organization's hub and the suppliers include
efficiency3 and maximum flexibility; 32 efficiency because each of the
parties is performing the task to which it is best suited,33 and flexibility
because the hub can disengage from its suppliers more readily since the
connection is by contract, not ownership.34

business that reaches beyond normal boundaries); see also Dickerson, supranote 23, at 764-67.
27. JAMES BRIAN QUINN, INTELLIGENT ENTERPRISE: A KNOWLEDGE AND SERVICE BASED

PARADIGM FOR INDUSTRY 32 (1992) (explaining that the virtual organization allows the hub to
focus on what it does best, i.e., its core competencies, while other functions are performed by third
parties in alliance with the hub); see also Dickerson, supra note 23, at 764-67. Concerning
monitoring quality as a core function, see Diana Jean Schemo, Is VW's New PlantLean, or Just
Mean?,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1996, at Dl (reporting that most ofthe 200 employees left on the VW
payroll after restructuring as a virtual organization would be focused on monitoring); see also
Dickerson, supranote 23, at 781. Nike maintains its own quality control personnel in the suppliers'
factories, but all other workers are employees of the suppliers. Nike's core competencies are design,
marketing, and technology. Nikeworkers.com, Source Materials, Andrew Young's Report,
availableat http://www.rpi.edu/-huntklnikeworkers/ay.html (lastvisited July 7, 2001) [hereinafter
Young's Report]. See generallyDana Canedy, Nike's Asian FactoriesPass Young's Muster,N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 1997, at D4.
28. Young's Report, supra note 27.
29. Id.
30. KENNEMR. MILLER& JOSEPHLEVINE, BIOLOGY 818 (1991) (explaining that conscious
action as well as "intelligence, learning, and judgment," are located in the cerebrum). Others have
used a similar analogy. WILLIAMGREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY ORNOT 25 (1997) (treating the hub
as brain).
31. See PETERF. DRUCKER, POST-CAPITALIST SOCIETY 94-95 (1993); QUINN, supranote 27,
at 32 (explaining that the structure is intended to allow each constituent part to perform only those
functions for which it is best suited, thus resulting in efficiencies).
32. See generallyDAVIDOW& MALONE, supra note 24, at 5. According to the champions of
the virtual organization, this combination offlexibility and focus on competencies makes maximum
use of computerization and thus brings back customizing typical of the 18th century in the context
of 19th century mass production. I6; see also Philip Manchester, Rise ofthe Virtual Corporation:
The Question Is Not If,
But When, FIN. TIMES (London), June 4, 1997, at 12; Dickerson, Virtual
Organizations,supranote 23, at 761-64.
33. See DRUCKER, supranote 31, at 94-95; QUINN, supranote 27, at 32. This represents, on
a micro scale, comparative advantage, the concept whose early proponent was the 18th century
economist, David Ricardo. See, e.g., CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & PETER H. LINDERT,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 17-21, 27, 33 (5th ed. 1973) (discussing comparative advantage).
34. See generallysupra note 32.
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The classic, vertically integrated business organization35 is different
from the virtual organization as a matter of degree.36 While all
manufacturers obtain supplies from third parties, the hub of a manufacturer
formed as a virtual organization contracts out the actual manufacture. 37
Although even the U.S. Department of Labor considers Nike to be a
manufacturer,3 in truth Nike is the hub of an entire virtual organization,
and it is this virtual organization, including all the suppliers, that truly
manufactures. Nike is thus the hub of a wheel on which the suppliers, the
companies actually manufacturing, are spokes bound by contract to the
hub.
For purposes ofthis Article, although the business organization consists
of the full wheel and spokes, it is the hub that is the "multinational." WalMart and Nike are multinationals. Their suppliers are indeed part-an
absolutely integral part-of the overall virtual organization and could be
considered part of the "multinational" Wal-Mart or Nike from the
perspective of their competitors and customers. However, because the
suppliers are connected to the hub by contract and not ownership, they are
not part ofthe hub for decisionmaking purposes. When analyzing how the
business form, governed by the hub, treats suppliers and their workers, it
is only the hub that is the multinational.39 Thus we can still speak, even in
the context of the virtual organization, of the multinational's-the hub's
-dominance over its suppliers.

35. In pre-computer times, vertical integration, the incorporation of some or all of the
functions from raw material, to manufacturing to wholesaling to retailing, was the acknowledged
means of reducing transactions costs. See, e.g., Seth W. Norton, Information and Competitive
Advantage: The Rise of General Motors, 40 J.L. & EcoN. 245, 258 (1997) (discussing the
integration of Fischer Body into General Motors (GM)). This is, in part, because of the importance
of information costs as transaction costs. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of
Production:Market FailureConsiderations,AM. ECON. REV. 112, 112-13 (1971). Indeed, it may
be that information efficiencies are precisely those for which GM was searching. GM already owned
a controlling interest in Fischer Body before the takeover. Therefore, GM's true purpose for the
takeover may have been to gain access to the Fischer brothers' management skill with collaborative
systems. See Susan Helperet al., The Boundaries of the Firm as a Design Problem 3-4, 16-18 (Nov.
14, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). Similarly, more current computers
reduce information costs, thus making possible the virtual organization. See generally DAviDow
& MALONE, supra note 24, at 5 (discussing technological advances necessary to virtual
organizations). See also Dickerson, supra note 23, at 764 n.13.
36. See generally Dickerson, supra note 23, at 766.
37. See, e.g., Schemo, supranote 27, at DI (describing the Volkswagen plant in Brazil where
actual manufacture is outsourced). See generallyDickerson, supranote 23, at 760-61 (describing
the Volkswagen plant in Brazil where the employees of the third-party suppliers come into the VW
plant in order to perform such manufacturing functions as bolting down engines and finishing cabs).
38. See, e.g., ILAB/DOL, supra note 5.
39. See Dickerson, supranote 23, at 764-67 (arguing that the hub governs by contract).
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2. Power Disparity Between Multinationals, and Developing-Country
Suppliers and Workers, Enhanced by Organizational Structure
The dismissal of the Bangladeshi workers in 1994 is an instructive
confirmation of the multinationals' power. Concerned about their image
among their developed-country customers,40 Wal-Mart and other
multinationals signal their displeasure by taking quick, ostentatious action
in order to mollify those customers and promptly affect thousands ofchildworkers a world away.
The multinational enterprises based in an industrialized country do
indeed wield extraordinary power over their suppliers in developing
nations. As Andrew Young said after he had completed an audit Nike had
commissioned, that company "has enormous leverage [over each factory
that manufactures its products]-some would argue 'de facto'
control-because of the factory's dependence on the huge Nike
contracts."' For its part, Wal-Mart's economic power would rank it 30th
among the worlds' 191 countries, ahead of Poland and Greece,42 and there
are eleven other corporations in the world even larger than Wal-Mart.43
Wal-Mart may have succumbed to the media-generated censure from
its developed-country customer market, but it freely exercised power in its
labor market. Indeed, shortly after the Bangladesh debacle, Wal-Mart
unilaterally adopted a more formal so-called code of conduct that defined
not only the multinational's behavior but also that of its suppliers." Other
multinationals have similarly adopted codes of conduct,45 which
demonstrates the multinationals' power over the suppliers; either the
multinationals imposing the codes have the power to expect compliance,

40. Nancy J. Kim, Companies Issuing Codes ofConduct; Shareholders,PublicBoth Apply
Pressure,THE BERGEN REC., Sept. 10, 1995, at BI (submitting to pressure from the public and
shareholders, Wal-Mart adopted its first code of conduct in the spring of 1993). See generallysupra

notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
41. Young's Report, supra note 27. Ambassador Young's comment about Nike's power is
particularly credible in view ofaccusations thathis review was, onthewhole, surprisingly favorable
to Nike. See, e.g., Canedy, supranote 27, at D2 (describing Young as surprisingly uncritical). Five
months after Young's report, an Ernst & Young investigation detailed carcinogens in a plant
making shoes for Nike in Vietnam. Steven Greenhouse, Nike Shoe Plant in Vietnam Is Called
Unsafefor Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1997, at Al.

42. INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, THE SWEATSHOP QUANDARY 21 (1998)
(comparing Wal-Mart's economic power based on 1996 sales to the gross domestic product of
nations) [hereinafter IRRC].
43. Id.
44. Kim, supra note 40; Mark Clifford, Trading in Social Issues; Labor Policy and
InternationalTrade, WORLD PRESs REv., June 1994, at 36 (explaining that Wal-Mart adopted a
code of conduct after earlier revelations about the behavior of its suppliers in Bangladesh).
45. See supranote 8 and accompanying text.
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or at least they have sufficient power to seek to transfer the public relations
risk to their suppliers."
Indeed, the hub's dominance over its suppliers is central to the
existence of the virtual organization. That is why the multinational allows
its essential, albeit not "core," activities to be performed by persons
connected only by contract rather than by ownership.47 The flexibility
sbught by the multinational depends on the hub's strength, because the
contractual nature of the virtual organization will not confer the desired
benefit unless the hub, as a practical matter, can cut the supplier adrift.48
Similarly, the vaunted efficiencies realized by Wal-Mart from ajudicious
allocation of responsibilities to the businesses best suited to perform them
may translate into efficiencies for the larger society. On the level of a
single virtual organization, nevertheless, the efficiencies flow from the
hub's anticipated ability to drive hard contractual bargains with the
suppliers and, thus, to reduce the price that the hub must pay the suppliers.
If the power disparity is significant, the hub's behavior may sink to the
level of opportunism and thus likely be inefficient on the societal level,49
46. See, e.g., Nike, Code ofConduct, athttp. /nikebiz.com/sociallabor/code.html (last visited
July 8, 2001) ("We bind our manufacturing partners to these principles."); Levi Strauss, Sourcing
Guidelines (2001), at http://www.levistrauss.com/about/code.html; ILAB/DOL, supra note 5, at
200 ("Wal-Mart requires conformity from its Vendor Partners with the following standards... !).
As to the possibility that codes of conduct are written without the companies promulgating them
expecting compliance from suppliers, see Jonathan Peterson & George White, Clinton Backs New
Code for Apparel Firms; Workplace: StandardsAim to Combat Child Labor,Pay Abuses and
Other Problems,L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1997, at D3 (reporting that human-rights activists criticize
the Apparel Industry Partnership's Code as "riddled with loopholes" and manufacturers object to
monitoring). See infra notes 218-19.
47. Dickerson, supra note 23, at 801-03 (arguing that virtual organizations survive only so
long as the hub is dominant). The process is somewhat self-limiting; if the hub is too powerful and
imposes excessively draconian terms on its suppliers, the suppliers will cut comers and adversely
affect quality. See Steven Casper, Long-Term Price-Clause Disputes in the German Car Industry:
Distributingthe Costs ofRestructuring 16 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on filewiththe author).
48. See Timothy J. Sinclair, Synchronic Global Governance andthe InternationalPolitical
Economy ofthe Commonplace,in APPROACHES TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCETHEORY 157,166 (Martin
Hewson & Timothy J. Sinclair, eds., 1999) (discussing the distancing of borrower from lender
through disintermediation and the borrower's resultant increased of power in the relationship).
49. Even the neoclassical law and economics scholars agree that opportunism is indefensible
as Kaldor-Hicks inefficient. See, e.g., Mkt. St. Assoc. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588,594-95 (7th Cir. 1991)
(Posner, J.) (suggesting that opportunism is not permissible behavior because the costs of
monitoring are too high); RICHARDA.POSNERECONOMICANALYsIS OFLAW § 4.8, at 117-18 (4th
ed. 1992) (suggesting that law can deter opportunism by imposing harsher sanctions on an
opportunistic breach); see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITTIONS OF
CAPITALISM 64-67 (1985) (arguing that opportunism increases transaction costs); TimothyJ. Muris,
OpportunisticBehaviorand the Law of Contracts,65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 524 (1981) (same). A
transaction is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the benefit to the winners exceeds the harm to the losers.
JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 84 (1988) (defining Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency). Kaldor-Hicks efficiency requires only the possibility of gain by the winners after
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but as a practical matter, the power disparity allows the hub to transfer
costs to its third-party suppliers-a result that it will be perceived as
efficient for itself, whatever the societal impact.50
Thus, the multinational possesses power over its suppliers. Indeed, the
modem organizational form, the virtual organization, is premised on that
dominance of the multinational hub over its suppliers.51 Further, if the hub
compensation to the losers, while Pareto superiority requires that the winners obtain an advantage
without disadvantage to those who do not win. Id.at 84-86 (comparing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to
Pareto superiority); see also id. at 71-72 (defining Pareto efficiency); Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency,
Utility,andWealth Maximization,8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 512-13 (1980) (same). That these issues
are still important is reflected in Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation:
Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 743-44 (1999). See also Deborah A.
DeMott, DoYou Have the Right to Remain Silent?: DutiesofDisclosurein BusinessTransactions,
19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 65, 71 (1994) (explaining that while the meaning of "opportunism" varies in
cases and academic writing, "[a]ll such meanings convey moral disapproval"). For a discussion of
the neoclassical lawyer-economists' concepts ofefficiency as value-laden, and as limited to "setting
up the legal system such that markets can achieve general equilibrium results," see Neil H.
Buchanan, BadEconomicsMakes BadLaw (Jan. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author) (Dr. Buchanan has a Ph.D. in economics).
50. It is also a result that the hub could not have achieved if it owned the suppliers, instead
of being related only by contract. Dickerson, supra note 23, at 776-78 (arguing that the purpose of
the hub is to foist costs onto the third-party suppliers, while moving costs to a wholly-owned entity
would only be moving costs from one part of the organization to another).
51. See supranotes 46-48 and accompanying text. Because the hub and suppliers are in an
infinitely iterative relationship, perhaps game theoretic cooperation is at work too as a glue to keep
the virtual organization from flying apart, at leastuntil such time as the hub decides to cut a supplier
adrift. However, although cooperation in this sense is not necessarily incompatible with selfinterested behavior, force is an impetus fundamentally different from an urge to cooperate. See
ROBERTAXELROD,THEEVOLuriONOFCOOPERAnTON I0-11 (1984) (providing examples of simple
two-party, tit-for-tat relationships).
There is also a question as to the extent to which either the hub or the suppliers truly consider
themselves to be in an indefinitely iterative process. See SourcingGuidelines,supranote 46 (stating
that although Levi Strauss will terminate relationships with contractors who do not conform, Levi
Strauss seeks "to develop strong alliances" with its contractors). If there is a surplus ofworkers and
no meaningful union, neither the employee nor the employer has any reason to believe that the
relationship between them will continue into the foreseeable future. Note that while the hub wants
to be able to cut the suppliers adrift, it anticipates that the suppliers, because of the hub's
dominance, will have neither a viable exit option nor a real opportunity to voice their own needs.
This implicates both the concept of unforced cooperation, and the assumption about an iterative
relationship. To the extent that the suppliers have no realistic exit option, the hub arguably no
longer needs to earn their loyalty. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 82
(1970). Of course, absent the suppliers' loyalty, the hub is exposed to agency costs, such as the
suppliers' shirking. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist
Society, 24 J. CORP. L. 869, 883 (1999). Shirking has occurred on a grand scale in virtual
organizations. See Steven Casper, Long-Term Price-Clause Disputes in the German Car Industry:
Distributing Costs of Industrial Restructuring 16 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). Volkswagen ceased enforcing draconian pricing clauses because, as prices fell, so did the
quality of the products supplied. Id. The existence of shirking suggests thatthe relationship is based
on force, not cooperation.
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exercises that power in order to reduce its costs, 52 developing-country
workers will suffer the impact. If the hub does transfer costs to the
suppliers, the latter have to cut costs to maintain profits. Labor is a cost. 3
Indeed, it is a variable cost54 so long as the employees are at will,55 as was
the case for the workers in Bangladesh. 6 As costs are pushed onto the
third-party suppliers, the suppliers can control those costs either by firing
the workers, or by impoverishing the working conditions for existing
employees. 7
The question is how likely are the hubs to exercise their power through
actions that will tend to harm workers? As the next section shows, the
virtual organization's very structure enhances the hub's remove from the
workers, and this increases the likelihood that the hub-the multinational
-will abuse the workers.
3. Psychological Distance from the Multinational to Its DevelopingCountry Suppliers and Workers, as Enhanced by Organizational
Structure
Because the vast majority of a virtual organization's services and
supplies are by definition sourced from a third-party supplier under
contract, there is both psychological and physical distance between the
supplier and the hub. Physical distance is easy to visualize; the hub in the
United States sources out to suppliers in Asia, in North Africa, and in
South and Central America.5"

52. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (discussing the hub's desire for finnspecific competence and flexibility). A hub that acts opportunistically is externalizing costs,
precisely because it is forcing those costs on its suppliers. See Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and
Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation, 23 N.M. L. REV. 1, 43 n.218 (1993) (defining an
externality as "something which cannot be the subject of a transaction (cannot be internalized in
the market process) or... a harm or benefit to third parties whose costs to transact concerning the
effect are greater than the gains from internalization"). The externality described in the second
clause is inefficient in Kaldor-Hicks terms. See supra note 49.
53. DONALD A. CORBIN, ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMIC DEcIsioNs 184-85 (1968).
54. Id. at 478. A variable cost is one which varies directly with output. Id.
55. 1 HENRY H. PERI, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISsAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.1, at 3 n.1 (4th
ed. 1998).
56. See supra pp.2-4.
57. See IRRC, supra note 42, at 62-66 (providing examples of practices to suppress wages
and of working conditions designed to increase productivity).
58. Nike, for example, has "Nike factories" in "Vietnam, Indonesia and China. . . totally
owned and operated by Asian companies who have contracts with NIKE (and others)." Young's
Report, supranote 27. Levi Strauss has manufacturers in Mexico, India, Israel, Croatia, Turkey,
Greece, and Tunisia, and a number of other countries. Levi Strauss & Co., About Levi Strauss &
Co., Worldwide (2001), athttp'/www.levistrauss.com/about (last visited Aug. 1,2001). We know
that Wal-Mart has suppliers in Bangladesh. See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
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Psychological distance, 59too, is part of the virtual organization's form
because there is disunity inherent in the firm.' First, and even leaving
aside cultural differences, 6 there exists a basic conflict of interest between
the hub and supplier; as we have seen, if and to the extent that the hub
succeeds in reducing what it pays its supplier, the supplier loses profits.62
In its turn, the conflict creates fundamentally inconsistent incentives for the
hub versus its suppliers. 63 Second, the workers are not employees of the
hub;64 they are employees of a supplier related to the hub by contract.
When the hub ostensibly seeks to improve its standing with its
industrialized-country market,65 it is instructing the suppliers how to treat
the suppliers' own employees, persons who have no direct relationship to
the hub. The virtual organization's contract-based structure thus
exacerbates the distance between the hub and the supplier's employees.
Because the workers do not belong to the hub, they are not part ofthe same
unit, not part of the same corporate culture. The virtual organization's
structure enhances the hub's indifference to the actual consequences
imposed on the developing-country workers, because these are structurally
as well as literally foreign.'

59. Dickerson, supra note 23, at 775-93 (arguing that the contractual relationship creates
distance).
60. This disunity within the virtual organization is different from the structure ofthe so-called
M-Form (multi-divisional) company. The latter, although highly decentralized, encourages

teamwork among divisional heads who report to senior management because the senior
management's vision of the good of the whole determines the unifying ethic. See WILLIAM G.
OucHI, THE M-FoRM SoCIETY 17-18 (1984).
61. See GREIDER, supra note 30, at 74 (referring to cultural egotism); see alsosupra note 58

(referring to some of the different parts of the world in which Nike has suppliers).
62. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text (discussing the zero-sum game between
hub and suppliers); see also Dickerson, supra note 23, at 776 (arguing that one purpose of the hub

is to foist costs onto the third-party suppliers).
63. Levi Strauss speaks of its suppliers as "partners" who are also referred to as "contractors."
Levi Strauss Sourcing Guidelines, supranote 8. For a discussion of a conscious, cynical reason for
calling suppliers "partners" when they are connected to the hub only by contract, see Dickerson,
supranote 23, at 796-98.
64. See Nikebiz.com, Labor, Code of Conduct, athttp'/www.nikebiz.com~laborlcode.shtmi
(last visited July 9,2001); see also Dickerson, supranote 23, at 767,781 (describing Wal-Mart as

a retailer that is a virtual organization); IRRC, supra note 42, at 101 (suggesting that workers are
hurt unbeknownst to the United States buyer). This structure also creates a problem concerning
motivation of the virtual organization's workers by the hub. See Dickerson, supranote 23, at 789-

93.
65. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. See generallysupra Part II.A.
66. Concerning the importance of corporate culture, see MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE: CREATiNGAND SUSTAIMNG SUPERIORPERFORMANCE 390 (1985) (suggestingthat unit

identities are important to performance for that unit as opposed to the entire firm). See generally
David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DuKE L.J. 201, 256-57 (discussing Time's
"corporate culture" with reference to Unocal v. MesaPetroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,955-56 (Del.
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Because of its power, Wal-Mart was able to implement in Bangladesh
what it perceived to be its developed-country customer market's anti-childlabor value. It was because of its psychological distance that it could do so
without focusing on the consequences to the developing-country workers
and, thus, cause devastating harm to the workers.67 Thus, it is unrealistic
to leave the protection of developing-country workers in the hands of the
multinationals, embedded as they are in their virtual-organization business
form.
Further, dangerous as it would be under any circumstance to depend on
the hope that these virtual-organization multinationals, prodded by the
markets, will in fact strive to eliminate child labor, it is particularly
dangerous in the international realm.
1985)). See also Dickerson, supra note 23, at 789-91 (suggesting that corporate culture creates
espritde corps). This is the distinction between contract and cooptation. See Lynne L. Dallas, The
RelationalBoard: Three Theories ofCorporateBoardsofDirectors,22 J. CoRP.L. 1, 11 (1996).
People will tend not to help others in distress unless the potential helpers belong to a group wherein
failure to help the outsider meets with the group's disapproval. TURNER, supranote 19, at 33-34,
126-28; see also GREIDER, supranote 30, at 69 ("Cheap people versus expensive machines"). At
the risk of overstating the point about psychological distance, the Army-commissioned report on
the My La massacre noted that some of the implicated soldiers viewed the Vietnamese as
subhuman. Jeffrey F. Addicott& William A. Hudson, Jr., The Twenty-FiflhAnniversaryofMyLai
A Time to Inculcate the Lessons, 139 MIL. L. REv. 153, 164 (1993) (citing WILLIAMR. PEERS,THE
MY LrA INQUiRY 230 (1979)). As a practical matter, the multinationals do make casual but
devastating financial demands on their distant suppliers, which in turn has an impact on the
suppliers' workers. See IRRC, supra note 42, at 95, 101 (describing price pressures on suppliers
and their impact on workers). Hubs move manufacturing to geographic areas with increasingly low
wages, from Europe to Asia, from Japan to China. GREIDER, supra note 30, at 69-70.
67. To be sure, the Wal-Mart/Bangladesh illustration also demonstrates that even
multinationals such as Wal-Mart are not free to act entirely as they please, because they do take
their own customer-markets into account. Based on free-market realities, the multinational
enterprises can and do focus their attention on their own customer markets, while the impacts are
felt by the vulnerable in distant locales. See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text. Pressure on
the multinational enterprises from their own markets is generated by individuals who capture the
attention of the press in the multinational enterprise's market. Harvey Araton,.AthletesToe the Nike
Line, But Students Apply Pressure,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at C3 (reporting how a 20 year-old
University of North Carolinajunior has organized the "Nike Awareness Committee" and obtained
press coverage). See generallyinfra Part IV.B.2 (concerning top-down, optional pressure). Nike's
public discussion of its rules for work conditions is obvious, thereby evidencing the public relations
importance of its efforts. See, e.g., Nikebiz.com, Responsibility, Monitoring Reports, Results and
Case Studies, at http://www.nikebiz.comllabor/indez.html (last visited July 9, 2001) (outlining
Nike's relationship with various watchdogs). However, the process is serendipitous, because it
depends on how self-motivated persons have mobilized the press to place pressure on the
multinational enterprise. The potential violence of the consequences is illustrated by the WalMart/Bangladesh example. From the developing-country workers' perspective, the multinationals'
codes of conduct, however much based on industrialized-country perceptions, are unilaterally
imposed and based on industrialized-country perceptions, and because the codes are applicable
directly to suppliers and workers in a developing nation, they necessarily raise the old universalismrelativism debate.
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B. The Dangerof Top-Down Implementation: The Universalism Versus
Relativism Debate
6
Since the turn of the last century, anthropologists have been arguing
either that there exist precepts that should be universally applied,69 or that
it is inappropriate for one community (typically a Western community) to
impose its values on another" because to do so would be a form of cultural
colonialism.7 The first group is universalist; the second, relativist. When
Wal-Mart terminated its suppliers and thus helped trigger mass dismissals
of child laborers, it was using an ostensibly universalist approach. Critics
of universalism would describe the debacle in Bangladesh as entirely
predictable because it failed to take into account Bangladeshi realities.'
What is the universalist value underlying the Wal-Mart demand? We
have been assuming that it reduces to self-preservation and reflects WalMart's assumption that its developed-country customer market condemns
child labor.' 3 However self-interested Wal-Mart's motives, the
multinational is imposing that value, or at least its consequences, on the
Bangladeshi workers.
From a relativist perspective, then, the codes of conduct that
industrialized-country economic powerhouses unilaterally impose on the
developing-nation workers are universalist and thus suspect. When WalMart imposes the elimination of child labor, the relativists would argue
that it is (arrogantly) imposing a universalist ideal.74 However, a purely
relativist analysis offers its own dangers; at its extreme, relativism
68.

ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS

RELATIVISM 63-64, 68 (1990) (discussing the challenge in the early part of the twentieth century
by Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, and Melville Herskovits to the then-prevailing universalist
perspective).
69. Id at 39; see also Guyora Binder, CulturalRelativism and Cultural Imperialism in
Human Rights Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211,212-13 (1999) (explaining that universalists
believe in a "universally valid moral principle" that inhere to all people, such as human rights).
70. RENTELN, supra note 68, at 9; see also Binder, supra note 69, at 214 (explaining that
relativists claim that there are no inherent rights not based in "society and culture").
71. RENTELN, supra note 68, at 65; see also Binder,supranote 69, at 213-14 (explaining how
relativists claim that universalist principles inhere only in the Western cultures that created them).
72. The relativist critique would be the same even if the imposed value were an aversion to
child labor, or, in commercial terms, support of good faith. However, I continue to assume that the
value is self-preservation, based on the apparent adoption of the developed-country customer
market's presumed aversion to child labor. See supra note 21 (discussing this assumption);
supra note 71 and infra note 83 (considering universalism as colonialist).
73. Supra note 21 and accompanying text. In commercial terms, that customermarket could
be described as having adopted an enhanced variant of good faith; the developed-country
customers, as perceived by Wal-Mart, insist that developing-country workers be treated with a sense
of fair play. See infra Part IlI.A.2.-3.
74. See supranote 71 and infra note 83.
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paralyzes because, if one culture cannot judge the values of another
culture, no action is appropriate other than, perhaps, inaction.75 The more
sophisticated relativists acknowledge that absolute and mindless tolerance
would require hands off everything from cannibalism to genocide as long
as that behavior is the norm in the relevant community.76 Different scholars
have proposed different methods to navigate between the shoals of
universalism and those of relativism.
Alison Dundes Rentein, for example, notes that ethnographic studies
reflect the eiistence of certain behaviors condemned in every culture;
behaviors that can be shown empirically to receive universal
condemnation.' Thus, a distinction exists between values that are in fact
universal, and those that are merely universalist, that is, values that are
philosophical or moral assumptions imposed by the dominant culture.78 At
worst universal values are benignly relativist since every culture approves
of them. For example, every culture reportedly condemns punishment
disproportionate to the crime.79 The problem, however, is that a universal
principle discerned when it remains in abstract form may prove far from
universal in application.8 ° While Western norms call for punishment of a
thief, Western culture asserts that cutting off the hand, as condoned by the

75. CHARLES LEMERT, POSTMODERNISM Is NOT WHAT YOU THiNK 100, 127 (1997).
76. RENELN, supra note 68, at 67 (making specific reference to Nazi atrocities); see also
Douglas Lee Donoho, Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search for
Meaningful Standards,27 STAN. . INT'L L. 345, 350-54 (1991).
77. RENTELN, supra note 68, at 88, 103-05 (suggesting that empirically, proportionality is
widespread). Another approach to the universalism-relativism debate that does not focus on an
empirical search for uniform standards suggests thatwe should investigatethe relevant community's
cultural norm and balance it against the international community's interest in its own norm. See
Berta Esperanza Hermndez-Truyol, Women's Rights as Human Rights-Rules, Realitiesand the
Role ofCulture: A Formulafor Reform, 21 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 605,664-65,672-73 (1996). While
an interesting invitation to rethink the universalism-relativism problem in less dichotomous terms,
this analysis has practical limitations; even assuming that the relevant community could be defined,
a mechanism to find the people or a process to weigh the interests effectively would have to be
devised.
78. See Binder, supra note 69, at 212 (discussing universalism).
79. EMILEDURKHEIM THEDIViSIONOFLABORIN SOCIETY 47 (W.D. Halls trans., Free Press
1997) (1933); RENTELN, supranote 68, at 96-137.
80. See Detlev F. Vagts & Donald L. Donoho, Book Review, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 419

(1991) (reviewing

AuSON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, UNIVERSALISM

VERSUs RELATIVISM (1990) and suggesting that the proportionality argument is vague and
indeterminate).
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Shari'a,8 ' is too harsh. 2 Thus the implementation of even a universal ideal
can have a universalist flavor.
Similarly, when the multinationals are seeking to protect their own
interests by responding to perceived demands from the developed-country
customer market, they arbitrage the Western value into developing-country
labor markets. Whether the value be self-preservation or the condemnation
of child labor, it is universalist unless proved to be truly universal, and it
thus confronts relativist concerns even before considering implementation
of the value. By questioning the justice and wisdom of eliminating child
labor, academic literature suggests that the anti-child-labor value is indeed
universalist.13 That is, if we were to apply ethnographic observation, we
would find that the anti-child-labor value is not truly universal. In contrast,
if the contrary evidence, including pronouncements of the International
Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations (UN), and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)," indicate that the

81. See Ahmad Abd al-Aziz al-Alfi, Punishment in Islamic CriminalLaw, in THE ISLAMIC
CRIMINAL JuSTIcE SYSTEM 227, 232 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982) (describing the application
of physical pain for theft under the Shari'a); see also Donoho, supranote 80, at 419 (discussing
proportionality).
82. Rachael E. Schwartz, Chaos,Oppression,andRebellion:The Use ofSelf-Help to Secure
Individual Rights UnderInternationalLaw, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 255, 288 n.108 (1994) (suggesting
that cutting off a thief's hand is "cruel and unusual"); Jacqueline M. Young, Note, Torture and
Inhumane Punishment of United States Citizens in Saudi Arabia and the United States
Government'sFailureto Act, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 663, 665 (1993) (asserting that
the "majority of the world" considers cutting off the thief's hand to be "archaic and barbaric").
83. See, e.g., Nicole de Maupeou-Abboud, The LegalAge ofEntry into the Labor Force,
Compulsory Education, and Vocational Trainingin France,3 CoMP. LAB. L. 200, 200 (1980)
(arguing that in the developing world, families need the economic support from child labor). The
experience in the United States is consistent. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, TransformingChildhood:
Apprenticeship in American Law, 31 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1113, 1123-26, 1165-66 (1997)
(suggesting that apprenticeship for middle-class children flourished in colonial times, only to be
replaced after the Industrial Revolution by child labor primarily from poor families); Richard A.
Epstein, The ProperScope ofthe CommercePower,73 VA. L. REV. 1387,1429-30 (1987) (arguing
that states failed to enact child labor laws for fear of harming their own manufacturers).
84. ILO's Child Labour Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, ILO Convention
No. 182 (1999) was "ratified by 27 governments in its first year,... more... than any other ILO
Convention during a comparable period." Press Release, International Labour Organization, Child
labour Convention achieves fastest ratification pace in ILO history (June 7, 2000), at
http:/www.ilo.org/publicenglish/bureauinf/pr/2000/24.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2001). The UN,
specifically Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan, has called on business leaders world-wide to engage
in a "Global Compact," the fifth ofwhose Nine Principles is "the effective abolition of child labor."
United Nations, Guidelines, Cooperation between the UnitedNations and the Business Community,
Annex 1 (July 17, 2000), at http://www.un.org/partnersbusiness/guide.htm (last visited Aug. 1,
2001) Even the OECD, whose members are predominantly the world's richest nations (see infra
note 229), has called for abolition of child labor. Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises IV.1(b) (2000), availableat
http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelinestmnetext.htin (last visited Aug. 1, 2001).
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anti-child-labor value essentially is uniformly accepted, then opposition to
child labor may be a universal value.
That, however, would not complete the analysis. The WalMart/Bangladesh illustration highlights the danger of applying a
universalist, or even possibly universal, value. Even assuming for purposes
of this piece that the norm against many forms of child labor is indeed
universal,85 the method of implementing this value may vary from culture
to culture. That is the problem with implementation, the focus of the rest
of my discussion. It was the implementation, whether or not tinged with
self-preservation, of an assertedly anti-child-labor value, whether or not
universal, that resulted in the mass dismissals of Bangladeshi child
workers.

What is the role for relativism here? Because implementation of the
value affects the developing-country workers, relativism demands that we
consider the workers' culture. Because the suppliers often are themselves
owned by interests not local to the workers,86 the suppliers are not an
adequate source of information about the workers' culture. Thus, the

relativist perspective on implementation of the universal value demands
cofisultation with the workers themselves87 in order to avoid another WalMart in Bangladesh debacle. 8
We now understand the current problem: the developing-nation

workers are remote from the industrialized-country enterprises, and their
distance is embedded in the very structure of those enterprises. The
solution is in the form of a compromise; identify a universal norm, and
then implement it through a relativist sensibility. The relativist perspective
on implementation requires that the developed-country multinationals enter

85. This assumption ofuniversalism is important in order to avoid the relativist risk that, for
example, abuse of certain children is deemed acceptable because it appears to be the norm in certain
regions. This risk is not negligible when considering female children. PARTHA DASGUPTA, AN
INQuiRYINTOWELL-BEG AND DE TmmON 310-11 (1993) (noting that female children in India
and Bangladesh receive less food than male children).
86. For example, one plant in Vietnam that manufactures for Nike is owned by a Korean.
Greenhouse, supra note 41.
87. See ILO Issue Paper, Practical Action to Eliminate Child Labour, International
Conference on Child Labour, Oslo, Norway (Oct. 1997), at http://www.ilo.org/public/english
/comp/childlonf/oslo/actis.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2001) [hereinafter 1LO Final Report]
(referring to the need for national, that is to say, relatively local, legislation). See generally infra
Part IV.C.
88. See ILAB/DOL, supra note 5, at 7 (Reports that the BGMEA's reaction to proposed
United States internal legislation to limit import of items made with child labor apparently resulted
in the dismissal of thousands of children from Bangladeshi factories; reportedly the dismissed
children "were forced to resort to more dangerous and lesser paid work in the informal sector.
Rumors circulated that many of the children ended up as street beggars, domestic servants, or were
forced into prostitution other reports noted that the children were hired by underground
subcontractors, working in hidden sweatshops under worse conditions than before.").
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into dialogue 9 with the developing-country workers. The goal of
implementing universal values through dialogue is to attenuate universalist
excesses, without falling into relativist paralysis. Unfortunately, the
multinationals' very business form enhances a universalist perspective
largely unadorned by relativist sensibilities; by acting as they believe their
developed-country customers demand, the multinationals are imposing
Western values without concem for the host country's culture. The
multinational thus remains an unlikely vehicle to protect developing
country workers, and the challenge is to identify any incentives that will,
fimally, encourage the multinationals to join in dialogue with the workers.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF NON-REGULATORY INCENTIVES FOR
DIALOGUE ON IMPLEMENTATION

Since a market is based on negotiations and interactions, it could offer
at least a context for effecting the universalism-relativism compromise.
Extralegal incentives for dialogue would mean that a relativist mode of
implementation could be self-executing and self-sustaining. Perhaps an
existing commercial norm, such as good faith, can encourage the
multinationals to institute a dialogue with developing-country workers,
even if the developed-country customer market demonstrates little interest
in dialogue. This dialogue would include discussion of the universal
norm's implementation. Perhaps multinationals can discern a satisfactory
reason to extend to developing-country workers a good faith norm that
multinationals already apply among themselves.
A. Good Faithas a Norm of Multinationals:The Inadequacy of the
Micro Perspective
While I can and do show that multinationals conform to a flavor of the
good faith standard when they interact among themselves, this is not
enough. As evidenced by the Wal-Mart/Bangladesh example and by the
reported behavior of other multinationals, they do not extend that
standard to developing-country workers. Indeed, as regards multinationals
based in the United States, they do not extend that standard even to home-

89. The European Union has been experimenting with the concept of dialogue between
workers and their employers. See David M. Trubek, Jim Mosher, & Jeffrey S. Rothstein,
Transnationalismin the Regulation ofLaborRelations: InternationalRegimes and Transnational
Advocacy Networks, 25LAW&SOC.INQUIRY 1187,1199-1200 (2000) (arguing thatsocial dialogue

creates standards through a process ofnegotiation between labor and management); see alsoKirstin
J. Miller, Comment, Human Rights ofWomen inIran: The UniversalistApproachandtheRelativist
Response, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 779, 821, 825-29 (1996) (discussing universalist concepts
within a relativist application.
90. See supra pp. 612-14.
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jurisdiction workers either. Thus, the good faith norm, by itself, has not
proven to be a sufficient foundation for multinational-worker dialogue.
Nevertheless, it is important to discuss good faith because it is a concept
familiar to multinationals and can provide a useful model.
1. How to Discern a Norm
What is the evidence of the multinationals' good faith norm? There is
a long tradition in the commercial arena for law to reflect reality, that is,
to reflect commercial practice.9 ' This tradition is respected in the
international commercial
context and means, essentially, that law is one
92
reflection of norms.
Whether we look for norms through practice as reflected by contract
terms or more generally through law, 93 we are, again, using observation
rather than fiat. If we observe that transnational contract terms and
commercial laws tend to reflect commercial realities and tend to be similar,
we surmise that the participants in practice have adopted similar values.
This analysis is fundamentally more similar to reliance on ethnographic
studies94 than to a top-down imposition of values.
In considering a complex, iterative relationship such as transnational
commercial transactions within a virtual organization or among major

91. See Bernard L. Shientag, LordMansfieldRevisited-A ModernAssessment,10 FORDHAM
L. REV.345, 351 (1941) (explaining that Lord Mansfield "created a body of systematic legal
principles, in conformity with the realities of business needs"). Karl Llewellyn, on the other hand,
may have been more aspirational when writing Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
See Claire Moore Dickerson, Cycles and Pendulums: GoodFaith,Norms, and the Commons 54
WASH. &LEEL. REv. 399,406-07 n. 18 (1997). But see LisaBemstein, The QuestionableEmpirical
Basis ofArticle 2's IncorporationStrategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 710-11
(1999) (The UCC, too, is premised on "customs and usages of trade.").
92. Larry A. Dimatteo, An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of
InternationalBusiness Transactions Plus the Internationalizationof Contract Law Equals
Unexpected Contract Liability, 23 SYRACusE J. INT'L L. & COM.67, 92-93 (1997) (arguing that a
code is more likely to be successful if it reflects existing principles rather than trying to create
them). But see Harold J. Berman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex
Mercatoria), 2 EMORY J.INT'L DISPUTE RES. 235, 289 (1988) (arguing that the only reason for the
UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) is that national laws are
not sufficiently uniform and that the "customary law of international commercial transactions [is
not] sufficiently well understood throughout the world"). See generallyHarold J.Berman &Colin
Kaufman, The Law ofInternationalCommercialTransactions(Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 221 (1978).
93. These two points of view are not wholly unrelated since the background law does help
determine what terms will be considered necessary. For example, unlike a French advertiser, an
advertiser under contract law generally applicable in the United States will not normally need to
specify thatthe advertisement is not an offer. E. ALLANFARNSWoRTH& WILLLAMF.YOUNG, CASES
AND MATERiALS ON CONTRACTS 165 (5th ed. 1995).
94. See supra text accompanying note 68.
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players, we could discuss many different norms. We could consider sales
terms or mechanisms for transferral of ownership." However, the focus
here will be on the norm of good faith, the classic standard ofperformance.
I choose this norm because it has an iterative, dialogic aspect at least in the
sense that each actor's standard ofperformance depends on the identity of
and relationship with the other actor." If the multinationals extend the
good faith norm to developing-country workers it will provide a basis in
commercial language to argue that the multinationals must consider both
the workers, and the impact of the multinationals' action on the workers.97
What is this good faith norm? As is true of other actors, the
multinationals have internalized norms.9" That is to say, there are certain
behaviors in which multinationals engage even when they are not
supervised, because these actors either believe the behaviors to be

appropriate or at least want to be observed as respecting them." If people

in fact behave in a specific way, they have internalized the norms."° By
looking at laws applicable across national boundaries, I can show that there

is indeed a norm of good faith applicable to transnational commercial
transactions.
2. Good Faith in Transnational Commercial Transactions

The codification contained in the United Nations Convention on

Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)' ° ' reflects

transnational commercial realities because a successful code "recognizes
and harmonizes existing general principles" instead of creating new

95. Professor Berman focused, inter alia,on price-delivery terms and the terms of bills of
lading. Berman, supranote 92, at 247-48, 254-55.
96. See infra notes 108-10, 126-30. The good faith standard, both in transnational and in
domestic transactions, depends on the context of and the relationship between the parties.
97. This is consistentnot only with the doctrine discussed in Part llI.A.2., infra,but also with
the principle underlying Professor Macaulay's famous description of reputational effects within
communities. Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelationsin Business:A PreliminaryStudy, 28
AM. Soc. REv. 55, 63-64 (1963).
98. See TURNER, supra note 19, at 40-42, 144 (discussing internalized norms).
99. The mere fact that persons ostensibly complying with a norm are supervised does not
preclude that norm from being internalized. Id. at 44 (noting that public compliance can include
private change).
100. Id at 40-42, 143.
101. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 19 I.L.M.
668 (1980) [hereinafter CISG]. The CISG was originally signed in Vienna on Apr. 11, 1980. The
United States ratified the CISG on Dec. 11, 1986, and the CISG became effective in the United
States on Jan. 1, 1988.
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principles from
whole cloth,"°2 and the CISG has gained quick
103
acceptance.
As to values reflected by the CISG, article 7 expressly refers to "the
observance of good faith in international trade. ' "' Unfortunately, although
the CISG confirms that something called "good faith" is a norm of the
transnational commercial community, it fails to define the term. 105 The
relevant definition cannot be located by merely looking at various national
laws, because the underlying national laws are not in total agreement." 6

102. Larry A. Dimatteo, The CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability: Unintended
Contractual Liability in InternationalBusiness Dealings,22 YALE J. INT'L L. 111, 144 (1997);
Dimatteo, supra note 92, at 92 (arguing that the CISG reflects reality); see also Clive M.
Schmittoff, The Codificationof the Law ofInternationalTrade, J. Bus. L. 34,42 (1985) (arguing
by implication that there are general principles of contract law). Butsee Berman, supranote 92, at
289 (describing the CISG as a codification but a codification needed because national legislation
was not uniform). However, lack of uniformity of national legislation does not necessarily mean
that there is no community among business people in transnational trade. See also Berman &
Kaufmnan, supra note 92, at 270-71 (describing the Uniform Law on the International Sale of
Goods, the progenitor of the CISG, as being based on actual "behavioral custom").
103. As of May 1, 2001, 59 nations had adopted the CISG. Pace Law School Institute of
International Commercial Law, CISG: Table of Contracting States, (June 5, 2001), at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countriestcntries.html. These countries represent "two-thirds of
all world trade.' Id
104. CISG, supranote 101, at 673 art. 7. Article 7 states:
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard isto be had to its international
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the
observance of good faith in international trade.
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on
which it is based....

Id.
105. Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation,146 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 780
(1998) [hereinafter Van Alstine, Dynamic] (considering the evolution in understanding of the
CISG's good faith requirement to cover acts of contracting parties). Especially early on, some
scholars maintained that the "good faith" obligation contained in CISG art. 7 is applicable only to
interpretation of the CISG and not to the actual acts of the parties. See, e.g., JOHN 0. HONNOLD,
UNiFORMLAWFOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDERTHE 1980 UNiTEDNATIONS CONVENTION

46 (2d

ed., 1991). Since then, however, other scholars have adopted the view that the "good faith"
obligation applies to acts as well as interpretation. See, e.g., Peter Winship, Commentary on
ProfessorKastely'sRhetoricalAnalysis,8Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 623, 633-35 (1988) (suggesting
that "good faith" under the CISG will probably ultimately require the parties to act according to that
standard); Michael J. Bonell, Article 7, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 65,
83-85 (C. Massimo Bianca& Michael J. Bonell eds., 1987). See generallyMichael P. Van Alstine,
Consensus, Dissensus,and ContractualObligationThrough the Prism of Uniform International
Sales Law, 37 VA. J.INT'L L. 1, 55 n.201 (1996) (discussing the progression of analysis of CISG
art. 7).
106. See Van Alstine, Dynamic,supranote 105, at 774 n.361 (noting that German "Treu und
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However, there is another international document relevant when searching
for the definition of good faith in the transnational commercial arena: the

UNIDROIT Principles for International
7

Commercial

Contracts

(UNIDROIT Principles). The UNIDROIT Principles do more than
include an express reference to "good faith and fair dealing;" ' they
specify that, if there is "gross disparity" between the parties, the weaker
party-for example developing-country workers, ifthe multinationals were
to extend the norm to them-can request the court to modify the contract
to "make it accord with reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing.""'° The stronger party's obligation includes a duty to cooperate
affirmatively with the weaker party.1 ' These UNIDROIT Principles are
presented not as binding legislation but as a restatement of existing
realitiesl 1 of existing "general principles of law.". 2 Thus the UNIDROIT
Principles further suggest the existence of both a basic concept of fairness
for the vulnerable in transnational commercial
and specific protection
3

transactions.1

Glauben" has become a "super norm" while U.C.C. § 1-203 relates only to "performance or
enforcement" of a contract). Actually, good faith is more generally applicable to contract even
under law relevant in the United States. See, e.g., Channel Home Ctrs., Div. of Grace Retail Corp.
v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding enforceable an agreement to negotiate in good
faith); see also infra Part III.A.3.
107. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of International
Commercial Contracts (1994) [hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles]. Ulrich Magnus, Remarks on
GoodFaith:The UnitedNations Convention on Contractsforthe InternationalSale ofGoods and
the InternationalInstitutefor Unification ofPrivateLaw, PrinciplesofInternationalCommercial
Contracts, 10 PACE INT'L L. REv. 89, 91 (1998) (suggesting that the UNIDROIT Principles may
be useful in defining good faith for purposes of the CISG). Unlike Professor Magnus, Professor
Farnsworth would limit the CISG's definition of good faith to interpretation of international
contracts. E. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and FairDealing Under the UNIDROIT
Principles,Relevant InternationalConventions, andNationalLaw,3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47,
56-57 (1995). But see supranote 105 (considering CISG's definition of good faith as not limited
to interpretation).
108. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 107, art 1.7; E. Allan Farnsworth, An International
Restatement: The UNIDROITPrinciplesofInternationalCommercialContracts, 26 U. BALT. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1997) (discussing good faith and fair dealing).
109. UNIDROIT Principles, supranote 107, art. 3.10(2).
110. Id., art. 5.3, cmt. (explaining the "duty of cooperation" as a combination of the principle
of good faith and fair dealing and the obligation to mitigate harm). A purchasing art gallery, more
experienced in exporting art than is the private seller, is "expected to give at least some assistance
to" the seller, "notwithstanding the contractual provision." lI
111. Unlike the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles are not legislative. Farnsworth, supra note
108, at 3.
112. The Principles are intended to apply "when the parties have agreed that their contract be
governed by 'general principles of law,' the 'lex mercatoria' or the like." UNIDROIT Principles,
supranote 107, Preamble; see Farnsworth, supra note 108, at 3.
113. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 107, art. 3.10. Article 3.10 is described by Professor
Farnsworth as basic fairness. Farnsworth, supra note 108, at 4. Article 3.10(lXa) speaks directly
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But do the benefits of that standard extend to developing-country
workers as a practical matter? So far the answer is negative, as reflected by
the Wal-Mart/Bangladesh example.
Faced with that negative response we could turn to domestic laws,
specifically the United States' domestic laws, to see whether that
jurisdiction extends the good faith norm to workers. While not dispositive

of the international norm's reach, the two members of the transnational

commercial community on which this piece focuses, Nike and Wal-Mart,
are both based in the United States. To the extent that executives at
headquarters are subject to sensibilities about the application of the good
faith norm to workers, they will be affected by their own experience in the
United States, 1 4 whether or not they apply the norm elsewhere. We are
looking at domestic law not to learn its substance but, rather, to glean the
multinationals' perception of what is the relevant transnational norm.
3. Domestic Norms in the United States
Thus, the fact that the multinational enterprises' hubs are in the United
States means that the trade practices in the United States may be those that
the hubs will, at a minimum, instinctively apply."' United States concepts
of contract-law good faith appear particularly ungracious with respect to
employees.'

to disparities of power: "Regard is to be had, among other factors, to (a) the fact that the other party
has taken unfair advantage of the first party's dependence, economic distress or urgent needs, or
of its improvidence, ignorance, inexperience or lack of bargaining skill ...
" UNIDROIT
Principles, supra note 107, art. 3.10(1).
114. See TURNER, supranote 19, at40 (suggesting thatpeople generally conform to the norms
of the group to which they wish to belong). Of course, if the norm in the United States is to abuse
workers geographically removed, then that will counteract any good faith norm indigenous to the
United States. Id. at 42 (noting that conformity is strongest when there is similarity among group
members). Thus, the norm could be to abuse foreigners.
115. Early on, the multinational enterprises asserted that the workers were employed not by
the multinational enterprises directly or indirectly but by independent suppliers, and that,
consequently, the multinational enterprises had no liability. Dara O'Rourke, Smoke From aHired
Gun: A CritiqueofNike 's Labor andEnvironmentalAuditing in Vietnam as Performedby Ernst
& Young, CorpWatch, at http://www.corpwatch.org/trac/nike/trac.html (Nov. 10, 1997). The hubs
had to sense an employment relation in order to insist on rejecting it.
116. See PERRIT, supranote 55, § 1.1 (noting that at-will employees can be fired without
cause); David J. Walsh & JoshuaL. Schwartz, State Common Law WrongfulDischargeDoctrines:
Up-Date, Refinement, and Rationale, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 645, 646, 675 (1996) (explaining that a
majority of states reject the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the context of at-will
employment); Kathleen C. McGowan, Note, Unequal Opportunity in At-Will Employment: The
Searchfor a Remedy, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 141, 142-50 (1998) (providing a survey of state law
and concluding that most employment in the United States is at-will and does not include a concept
of good faith).
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When considering the obligations of hubs to workers, we need not
embark on a strictly contractual analysis of good faith or of any other
performance standard, because the hubs' direct relationship is with the
suppliers, not with the workers."' Nevertheless, because law is a proxy for
the norm,"' we should at look at applicable law here, just as we did in the
international arena." 9
The national-level interpretation in the United States ofthe "good faith"
2
standard is restrictive,' especially in the context of at-will employees.' 1
As were the Bangladeshi child workers described in the introduction, such
employees are susceptible to involuntary discharge. While some states of
the United States have attenuated the draconian application of the at-will
principle, 2 and federal law has limited the right of employers to discharge
employees, at least if the workers are members of a protected class,' 3 at-

117. Workers are employed by suppliers, not the hub. See supraPart II.A. (discussing virtual
organizations); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 10.1, at 742 (2d ed. 1990)
(explaining that generally, only the party to a contract can enforce the rights under the contract).
Assuming that, despite the hubs' market-driven motivation in including performance requirements
in their contracts with suppliers, the workers as "beneficiaries" have rights against the promisors,
in this case the promisors are the suppliers, not the hubs. Id., § 10.3, at 750 (discussing the modem
third-party beneficiary rule).
118. See supranote 92.
119. See supraPart III.A.2.
120. Van Alstine, Dynamic, supra note 105, at 774 n.361 (comparing German "Treu und
Glauben" to U.C.C. § 1-203). That concept was, nevertheless, the origin of the common law of
good faith. See Farnsworth, supranote 107, at 51-54 (explaining that the concept was transported
from Germany to the United States by Professor Karl Llewellyn and then to Australia and on to
Canada and even to England). Note also that "good faith," and "good faith and fair dealing" can
have very precise meanings in commercial law. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 2-103 (1977).
Professor Farnsworth laments the UNIDROIT Principles' indifference to these distinctions.
Farnsworth, supra note 107, at 49 n.15. The draft §§ 1-201(22) & 2-102(22), submitted to the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, meeting in July and August of
2000, both refer to "good faith" and to "fair dealing."
121. See supra notes 55, 116.
122. It is easier to find an implied contract in California, for example, than in New York.
Compare Scott v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 904 P.2d 834, 838-39 (Cal. 1995), with Murphy v. Am.
Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that there is no good faith covenant
for at-will employment contracts).
123. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964)
(prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion, and national origin); Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1967) (same for age); Americans With
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113 (1994) (same for disabilities); Civil Rights Act of
1991, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(1991) (prohibiting sexual harassment). See generally McGowan, supranote 116, at 165; Ann C.
McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment At Will: Toward a Coherent National
Discharge Policy, 57 OHIo ST. L.J. 1443, 1448-52 (1996) (considering the federal statute
insufficient but not targeting either sexual or racial harassment); David Weil, Are MandatedHealth
andSafety Committees Substitutesfor or Supplements to Labor Unions?,52 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
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will employees normally can be dismissed without cause. 24 Indeed, there
may even be an evolving norm accepting mass layoffs, at least as a costcutting measure to appease investors.' 2 That, however, may be different
from dismissing employees to improve public relations with customers.
On the other hand, at least under commercial law outside the
employment realm, in the United States "good faith" incorporates a strong,
general sense of fairness.' 26 If good faith is placed on a continuum from
contract-law good faith through to trust-law fiduciary duty, the standard of
performance rises in proportion to the power of the transactor, from the
arm's length level just above opportunism, all the way to the fiduciary duty
of a trustee. 2 ' Thus, a managing partner, whose performance affects the

other partners for good or ill, has a higher duty than an ordinary partner.'
Similarly, a percentage lessee, whose lessor depends on the lessee's
performance to recover rent, owes a duty higher than mere good faith;'

REV. 339 (1999) (arguing that the Occupational Safety and Health Act can be effective).
124. See supra notes 55, 116.
125. Reaction to mass firings appears to be less negative today than even a few years ago.
Compare Stuart Silverstein & Davan Mah araj, Company LayoffProjectionsOften Don 'tAdd Up,
L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1999, at Cl (reporting that AT&T's 1996 announcement of 40,000 layoffs,
approximately 30% of its workforce, was denounced by the media and unions), with Tim Burt &
Nikki Tait, Companies & Finance International, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 30, 2001, at 36
(reporting that Daimler Chrysler's announcement oflayoffsinNorth America"broughtan unhappy,
but less than totally hostile, reaction from union officials").
126. Claire Moore Dickerson, FromBehind the Looking Glass: Good Faith,FiduciaryDuty
andPermittedHarm,22FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 955,979-93 (1995); Dickerson, supranote 91, at 40311 (arguing that in the United States, good faith is a norm on a continuum from the avoidance of
opportunism up to the highest level of fiduciary duty, depending on the relative power of the
parties). Professor Summers himself defined good faith in the negative, as anything that is not bad
faith. Robert S. Summers, "GoodFaith"in GeneralContractLaw and the Sales Provisionsofthe
Uniform CommercialCode, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 204.06 (1968).
127. See Dickerson, supra note 126, at 979-93; Dickerson, supra note 91, at 403-11
(suggesting the continuum metaphor). For a procedural perspective on the continuum, see Marleen
A. O'Connor, Restructuringthe Corporation'sNexus ofContracts:RecognizingaFiduciaryDuty
to ProtectDisplacedWorkers, 69N.C.L.REv. 1189, 1250-51 (1991) (suggesting that the burden
of proof shifts when moving from good faith to fiduciary duty).
128. Saballus v. Timke, 460N.E.2d 755, 760 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983); Cronin v. McCarthy, 637
N.E.2d 668, 675 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994); see also Donald 3. Weidner, A Perspective to Reconsider
PartnershipLaw, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1,21-22 (1988). See generallyDickerson, supranote 91,
at 409-10 (discussing managing partners). For an interesting perspective on the dependencedominance structure of fiduciary duty, see William W. Bratton, Game Theory andthe Restoration
ofHonorto CorporateLaw's Duty ofLoyalty, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 139 (Lawrence
E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
129. Stoddard v. Ill. Improvement & Ballast Co., 113 N.E. 913, 915 (Ill.
1916) (requiring a
percentage lessee to quarry "diligently"); Steggebruch v. Stosor, 33 N.E.2d 159, 161 (Ill. App. Ct.
1941) (requiring a percentage lessee to use "reasonable diligence"). See generally Dickerson, supra
note 91, at 407 (discussing percentage lessees).
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this is consistent with the UNIDROIT Principles' perspective. 3 ° Because
of its extraordinary power, the principle of good faith would impose on
multinational enterprises' hubs a particularly high standard in their
behavior toward developing-country
suppliers and, ultimately, to the
3
suppliers' workers.' '
Presumably, the hubs will still want to shove costs onto their dominated
suppliers, and the suppliers will still want to reduce those costs by
lowering wages. However, if the playing field were leveled'32 by the
application to workers of a norm based on principles of good faith, these
workers would be instrumental in keeping themselves from being abused.
They would be at least as effective as any code of conduct generated by an
industrialized-country enterprise such as Wal-Mart or Nike, ostensibly for
the protection of developing-nation workers.' 33 We are not there yet.
Whatever standard the multinationals apply to each other in international
commerce, they do not extend the good faith norm to developing-country
workers. Further, the United States multinationals' home norm hardly
constrains their dealings with home-jurisdiction workers.
Commercial-law good faith has thus proved inadequate to protect
developing-country workers. A macro-level extralegal pressure, on the
other hand, might encourage the multinationals to extend the essence of
their micro, commercial-law good faith norm to developing-country
workers.

130. See supra note 113.
131. See supra Parts II.A.l.
132. Even the neoclassical law and economics scholars may have little difficulty with the

ultimate result in this case. Once the workers are members of the transnational commercial
community, they can negotiate meaningfully and thus can agree. They understand that sometimes
the agreement would be hypothetical rather than actual. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform
PartnershipAct: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 BUS. LAW. 45, 58-59 (1993) (suggesting that
partners "often negotiate in detail or are participating in sophisticated, idiosyncratic tax-motivated
'deals"). That, however, is an assumption of sophistication that is not always borne out. See
Dickerson, supranote 91, at 421-22. Further, the idea of a level field is desirable to at least some
of these scholars. Richard S.Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the
DeterminationofLegal Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1169, 1176-77, 1194 (1984) (a lawyereconomist suggests either utilitarianism or egalitarianism as the values in connection with the
efficiency analysis). For a discussion of efficiency and its balancing of advantages to one party as
against disadvantages to the other, see supranote 49. But see POSNER, supranote 49, § 2.2, at 23
(discussing wealth maximizers).
133. To be sure, we have seen that the industrialized-country enterprise does not in fact initiate
the code of conduct forthe workers' benefit, but ratherthat the industrialized-country hub generates
such a code of conduct in order to satisfy what the hub perceives to be the demands of its
industrialized-country customers. See supra note 40 and Part II.A.
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B. Overcapacityas Carrotand Developed-CountryMarkets as Stick:
The Inadequacy of the Macro Perspective
To take the macro perspective, perhaps the multinationals'
overcapacity' 34 will drive them to consider developing-country workers as
prospective customers and, thus, as persons to be taken seriously. It is not
at all clear that overcapacity does cause a manufacturer to open new
markets instead of simply curtailing its activities.' 35 Nevertheless,
overcapacity is the kind of extralegal, positive impetus that could have a
salutary influence if all the pieces fall into place. To take the negative
perspective, perhaps the boycott stick wielded in the developed-country
customer markets will intimidate the multinationals into dialogue.
Unfortunately, this second, negative alternative does look suspiciously
similar to the Wal-Mart/Bangladesh facts.
1. Overcapacity as Carrot
To consider the carrot first, there is arguably overcapacity; the
136
producers' ability to generate goods exceeds demand for those goods.
The manufacturers are as a consequence constantly looking for new
markets. 37 To pursue the argument, ifthe industrialized-country producers
are experiencing overcapacity with respect to consumer goods
specifically,' the developing-country workers are potential capacity
sponges. 139 As Harou Shimada, a Japanese economist and an adviser to the
Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry has emphasized, this
model suggests that overcapacity will vastly increase as China cranks up

134. SeegeneraIyLESLIESKLAIR, SOCIOLOOYOFTHEGLOBAL SYSTEM(1991) (discussing the
creation of demand by multinational enterprises); GREIDER, supra note 30, at 168 (discussing
increased demand).
135. Overcapacity leads companiesto bankruptcy or, because oftheir inefficiency, makes them
dependent on a subsidy. Robert Hormats, Reflection on the Asian FinancialCrisis,34 INT'L LAW.
193, 195 (2000). Manufacturers in an overproducing industry have sought to cartelize in order to
reduce output. Andre Fiebig, CrisisCartelsandthe Triumph oflndustrialPolicyOver Competition
Law in Europe, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 607, 621-23 (1999).
136. See James K. Galbraith & Maria Papadakis, New Directionsin Technology Policy, 5
STAN. L. &POL'YREV. 93,97 (1993) (discussing worldwide overcapacity in production); see also
Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to TransnationalInsolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 28
n. 135 (1997) (arguing that overcapacity means excess supply).
137. See Galbraith & Papadakis, supra note 136, at 97 (suggesting that overcapacity creates
competitive pressures); see also GREIDER, supra note 30, at 45 (discussing the need for new
markets).

138. MICHAEL J. PioRE & CHARLES SABEL, TiH SECoND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE 184 (1984)
(suggesting that industrial countries' consumer-goods markets are saturated).
139. See GREIER supranote 30, at 168 (suggesting that raised wages would create increased
consumer demand); see also PIORE & SABEL, supra note 138, at 125 (explaining that workers
comprise a market).
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its manufacturing capability."
Thus, the developed countries'
overcapacity promises to become more pronounced. In a consumptiondriven economy that already produces beyond demand, failure to create
new markets will mean disincentive to investment and growth. 141 The only
growth solution is for the industrialized-country businesses to increase the
pool of customers,' 42 a task that the multinationals have found difficult
because they are not universally welcomed as sellers by the emerging
economies.' 43
44
Arguably in response to the emerging economies' entry barriers,
multinational enterprises have established production in those emerging
economies, thus creating international virtual organizations. 45 In
consequence, the multinationals now have workers, their suppliers'
employees, in emerging economies. The goods are in those countries when
produced. The workers are there, and ifthe workers have adequate wages,
they can be consumers as well." Further, or so the argument goes, the
multinational enterprises should care, should extend the good faith norm
to developing-country workers, because the multinationals will succeed
without the benefit of the good faith norm only so long as they remain
dominant. That is precisely the same analysis as used to explain why
virtual organizations do not fly apart; the suppliers stay with the hub only
so long as the hub is dominant because all the other pressures seek to
separate the supplier from the hub. 47 Should the multinational enterprises'
overcapacity become so severe that the balance ofpower shifts to the labor
force, it will be the multinationals' turn to be grateful for the protection of
the good faith norm. If the multinationals hope to be treated fairly by their
workers after these workers have become customers, in other words, as
these workers become relatively powerful in relation to multinationals that

140. GREIDER, supra note 30, at 162, 167 (discussing China and overcapacity).
141. See PiORE& SABEL, supra note 138, at 77 (suggesting that mass consumption economies
will deflate as wages fall, exacerbating existing overcapacity).
142. SeeGREIDER, supranote30, at 45,162,167(discussingthe need to increase markets and

quoting economist Shimada on the urgency of making the Chinese "as rich and rotten as the rest
of us"). The movement of goods to foreign markets is precisely what has happened as industrial
countries' markets have become saturated. PIORE &'SABEL, supra note 138, at 185.
143. Trade has been principally to other industrialized countries, because the emerging-market

nations have set up tariffs and other barriers in order to protect their own nascent industries. PIORE
& SABEL, supra note 138, at 188-89.

144. See id. at 200-01 (discussing production in emerging economies).
145. See id. (discussing multiple, global sourcing).
146. That is precisely the recommendation of the Japanese economist Harou Shimada with
respect to Chinese workers, if Japan is not to b drowned by China's developing overcapacity.
GREiDER, supra note 30, at 167; supra text accompanying note 140.
147. See supra Part II.A.2. (discussing virtual organizations).
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have overcapacity, the multinationals must begin by cooperating, by
behaving in good faith now. 48
This is optimistic, of course. Nike does report that workers who
manufacture its products receive more than the host country's minimum
wage. 49
' However, that is not yet evidence that multinationals do perceive
developing-country workers as potential customers. Further dimming the
likelihood that overcapacity will prove to be an effective engine for change
is the reality that any benefit that the multinationals can derive from today
treating developing-country workers well is not only uncertain, but is also
in the distant future, if and when workers actually do become customers.
The multinationals will tend to discount benefits that are uncertain 5 ' and
far in the future.'' In contrast, the benefits to the hub of convincing
suppliers to lower their price even at the expense of lowered conditions for
workers affords the purchasing multinationals an immediate and tangible
benefit.
Thus, given the uncertainty both of the overcapacity assumption and of
any potential benefit, and given the industrialized-country hub's structural
incentive to ignore the abuse of workers by the suppliers, overcapacity is
an unlikely engine for change.
2. Developed-Country Customer Market as Stick
If the overcapacity carrot is inadequate to convince the multinationals
to treat developing-country workers well, perhaps the customer market's
stick will be more effective.
As was the case for Wal-Mart in the introductory illustration, the
developed-country market does carry a big stick that can dominate the hub.
We saw Wal-Mart struggle to satisfy what it perceived to be the demands
of its marketplace when it cancelled its contracts with Bangladeshi
suppliers. 5 2 We have seen that Wal-Mart and Nike adopted their codes of

148. See AXELROD;supra note 51, at 10-I1 (suggesting a tit.for-tat relationship).
149. Group Links, supranote 16 (quoting aNike spokesperson claiming that wages paid "far
surpass regional or national minimum wages"); see also Jaime Sneider, GoodPropaganda,Bad
Economics, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,2000, at A23 (reporting that Nike wages in Vietnam are "more

than twice the country's average annual income").
150. seePERL. BERNSTEIN,AGAINSTTHEGODS: THEREMARKABLESTORYOFRISK 312-13
(1996) (suggesting that the greater the uncertainty that an option will hit the strike price, because
the stock lacks volatility for example, the less an investor will pay for the option).
151. See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 86 (1988) (noting that the pain of

subsequent dieting does not prevent the dieter from eating the German chocolate cake at hand).
152. ILAB/DOL, supranote 5, at 7. For further evidence of the importance of customers in
the United States, see John H. Cushman, Jr., May 10-16; Nike Makes Amends, N.Y. TIMES, May
17, 1998, at 4:2 (quoting a chief executive officer from Nike as saying, "It]he American consumer

does not want to buy products made in abusive conditions").
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conduct in response to concerns about their customers' reaction to bad
publicity 53 and not out of regard for developing-nation workers." 4
The stick may be persuasive, although punishment tends to be less
effective than positive or even negative reinforcement.'55 However, even
to the extent that the stick does manage to modify the multinational's
demands on its suppliers, it succeeds not because the multinational wishes
to avoid child labor. Rather, the multinational is focusing on avoiding
economic punishment by its customers in its developed-country markets.
This is a market-based constraint, but a constraint based on markets other
than those the workers occupy, and we saw the result of such an
arrangement in Bangladesh. At least the overcapacity carrot is focused on
a single market; the developing-country workers are themselves also the
potential customers. Thus, even if the stick can be effective, its impact is
not necessarily favorable. It did not cause Wal-Mart, for example, to
extend some variant of the good faith norm to its developing-country
workers in 1994.156
As the Wal-Mart/Bangladesh example vividly illustrates, these macro
extralegal constraints are imperfect.'57 Despite any overcapacity and
despite the developed-country customer market's authority, Wal-Mart's
reaction to the bad publicity in the United States has not protected
developing-country workers. 5 More generally, the unilateral efforts of
multinationals to rein themselves in have not successfully protected those
workers.'9 Neither macro perspective has, as a practical matter, caused the
153. See supranote 8.
154. See supra note 40. See generally Part II.A.
155. Punishment is less effective than a reinforcer because it may teach behavior necessary to
avoid punishment, such as dissembling, rather than teaching the desired behavior, in this case the
elimination of child labor. See DAVID G.MYERS, PSYCHOLOGY 306-07 (6th ed. 2001). A negative
reinforcer is an undesired condition or event removed in order to effectuate a desired response. For
example, an electric shock removed as a consequence of a particular behavior is a negative
reinforcer of that behavior. B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 73 (1953).

156. See infra notes 214-17. While dismissing workers may please investors, it is not
necessarily a way to ingratiate oneselfaffirmatively with the consuming public. See supranote 125.
157. Other extralegal constraints may bear consideration, such as game theory. Game theory,
however, cannot protect workers because workers have not been party to transactions with the
multinational's hubs and, therefore, there is not an infinitely iterative process between them. See
AX)LROD, supranote 51, at 10-11 (analyzing a simple tit-for-tat relationship and suggesting that
cooperation tends to lead to cooperation).
158. See supra note 16 (considering continuing abuse); see also supra note 40 and Part II.A.
(discussing Wal-Mart's reason for adopting a code of conduct).
159. College students and other sweatshop-opponents have caused Nike and othersto improve
working conditions overseas; Nike Chairman Phil Knight confirms that the anti-sweatshop
movement "probably speeded up some things that we might have done anyway." Steven
Greenhouse,Anti-Sweatshop Movement Is Achieving Gains Overseas,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,2000,
at A10; see also Kahn, supra note 17 (reporting continuing criticism of multinationals, including
Nike).
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multinationals to extend a good faith standard to developing-country
workers by opening a dialogue with those workers.
IV. TRANSITION TOWARD A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
Because the multinationals apply a good faith standard of performance
among themselves, it is their norm."6 It reflects the values that the
multinationals voluntarily apply to each other. We also know that the
multinationals exclude developing-country workers from the umbrella of
the good faith standard. 6 Thus, exclusion of workers from the good faith
norm is itself a norm.162 Nevertheless, because the good faith standard is
already familiar to multinationals, 63 and because protection of the
vulnerable is inherent in the concept of good faith,' this standard can
become ajumping-off point for changing the multinationals' treatment of
developing-country workers. The problem is how to convince the
multinationals to extend, and perhaps enhance, that familiar standard so as
to accept the obligation to consult workers, which is essential to a relativist
implementation of the anti-child-labor value. 65 The question is how to
effect the transition to that goal.
The first subpart below describes generally how norms are modified,
providing the conceptual elements of achieving a transition to a level
playing field for workers. Note that, if the anti-child-labor standard is not
in fact a universal value, then it, too, is a norm that could be extended to,
for example, the developing-country workers' community. In that case, the
following discussion would apply to the method of extending the antichild-labor norm as well as the good faith norm. However, for purposes of
this Article, I continue to assume that opposition to child labor is a
universal value.'" Therefore, I am here focusing on implementing this
value with due regard to relativist sensibilities, that is, by extending to
workers the benefits of an enhanced good faith norm.

160. See TURNER, supranote 19, at 4, 44.
161. See supra Part III.A.
162. See DURKHEIM supra note 79, at 219 (suggesting that cooperation develops from a

commonality of habits); see also TURNER, supra note 19, at 20 (suggesting that "uniformity
pressures and group formation have a reciprocal influence on each other").
163. See supra Part III.A.2.-3.
164. See supra notes 110 & 128-31 (suggesting that increased power means greater
responsibility under the good faith norm).
165. See supra Part II.B.
166. See supra notes 84-89.
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A Modification of an ExistingNorm: ConceptualUnderpinnings
Norms are relatively easy to change when they are close to their
"tipping point."'67 The classic example from sociology is the abandonedcar experiment; a car without license plates and with the hood up left in a
low-crime neighborhood may remain untouched for a week or more,16S
whereas a similar car left in a high-crime neighborhood will likely be
stripped in a few hours.' 69 In the high-crime neighborhood, the unattended
car was at the tipping point; removing the plates and opening the hood,
relatively small changes, can in that context have an enormous impact. 7 '
The impact is not merely enormous, it is exponential.' 7 ' Once a norm
is at the tipping point, a small change will be similar to a person with a

cold who has a ten percent chance of infecting not just one but two people.
Although ten percent means that on average only one out of every ten ill
people will infect two others before becoming well, the effect of
compounding can launch an epidemic."
Game theory comes to the same conclusion from a different
perspective."13 In a multi-party environment, a determined and organized
group of non-cooperators can successfully invade a territory of

167. Malcolm Gladwell, The TippingPoint,NEw YORKER, June 3,1996, at 32-38 (discussing
the theory of a tipping point); see also Dickerson, supra note 91, at 423-25 (discussing a tipping
point); Philip Zimbardo, The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, and Order Versus
Deindividuation,Impulse, andChaos,in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUMONMOTIVATION 237,287-93 (W.
J. Arnold & D. Levine eds., 1969) (referring to a "release signal").
168. See Zimbardo, supra note 167, at 290 (discussing a car left for a week in Palo Alto,
California).
169. Zimbardo, supra note 167, at 287 (discussing a car left in the Bronx which was stripped
in 26 hours). See generally H. Range Hutson et al., The Epidemic ofGang-RelatedHomicides in
LosAngeles Countyfrom 1979 through 1994, 274 J.AM. MED.ASS'N. 1031 (1995); J. Crane, The
Epidemic Theory of Ghettos and the Neighborhood Effects on Dropping Out and Teenage
Childbearing,96 AM. J. Soc. 1226 (1991).
170. Supranote 169. Gladwell suggests that any slight deviation (he refers to a broken window
in a car instead of missing plates and opened hood) may be the tipping point. Gladwell, supranote
167, at 38. Actually, the deviation is not the tipping point; it is the force sufficient to get past the
tipping point when, as was the case in the high-crime neighborhood but not the low-crime
neighborhood, circumstances are already close to the tipping point. See supra text accompanying
notes 168-69. Concerning social influence generally, see Dan M. Kahan, SocialInfluence, Social
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997). See generally Claire Moore Dickerson,
PoliticalCorruption:Free-FlowingOpportunism,14 CONN. 3.INT'LL. 393 (1999) (discussing the
abandoned car at the tipping point).
171. See Hutson, supra note 169, at 1031 (regarding an epidemic of vandalism); Gladwell,
supranote 167, at 36-37 (regarding crime); see also Dickerson, supra note 91, at 423-24 (regarding
an epidemic of social influence).
172. See supra note 171.
173. See AXELROD, supranote 51, at 173-74 (focusing on cooperation built as reciprocity in
the context of a relationship of indefinite duration).
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cooperators.' 74 Once the group of non-cooperators has invaded, those
indigenous to the territory develop an incentive to defect as well, given that
cooperation will increasingly become an invitation to be abused by the
interlopers.'" Moral judgment is irrelevant to the concept of defection;
even if we assume that the good faith norm is desirable, extending the
good faith norm to developing-country workers requires a defection from
the existing norm that excludes the workers. If the defectors from the
exclusionary good faith norm are sufficiently consistent and concerted as
they extend that norm to developing-country workers, other multinationals
will at some point have to follow suit as the supply of available, qualified
workers constricts relative to demand. Social influence theory says that the
defectors' behavior will have created a new norm of extending the good
faith standard to workers. 76 The more cynical law and economics analysis
would report a new perception among multinationals that it is in their selfinterest not to alienate the current labor force and potential customer
base.'" Either way, the defectors' actions result in the workers benefitting
from the good faith norm.
The multinationals' adoption of codes of conduct""8 could suggest that
the refusal to extend good faith to developing-country workers may be
weakening. More cynically, we also have seen that these efforts have not
in fact protected workers'79 and that the codes may be a response to the
multinationals' industrialized-world customers rather than to any extension
to workers of a good faith norm."s Nevertheless, changes in visible
behavior, whatever their motive, have social influence; others, watching
the behavior, may believe that they are seeing an internalized norm to
which they must conform to be accepted."" Thus, other multinationals may
seek to join the defectors from the exclusionary norm. That is, those
multinationals may choose to enhance the good faith norm and include
developing-country workers within that norm in order to avoid losing
potential advantage both in the customer markets now existing in the

174. AXELROD, Supra note 51, at 162-63 (suggesting that "meanies" colonize if the iterations
will continue beyond the foreseeable future); see also Dickerson, supranote 91, at 423 (considering
game theory and defectors).

175. AXELROD, supra note 51, at 60; Dickerson, supra note 91, at 423-24 (regarding the
accelerating incentive to defect).
176. At first, such an influence would be predominantly indirect See TURNER, supranote 21,
at 111. With enough cohesive push, the defectors in favor of extending the good faith norm will
have a compelling influence. See supranote 174.
177. See POSNER, supranote 49, § 2.2, at 23 (discussing wealth maximizers).
178. See supra note 8. See generally ILAB/DOL, supra note S.

179. See supra note 16.
180. See supranotes 40, 44. See generally Part II.A. (suggesting that multinationals adopt
codes of conduct because of pressure from their customer-markets).
181. See TURNER, supranote 19, at 44 (considering public compliance and social influence).
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industrialized world and in the markets expected to emerge in developing

countries. This, of course, assumes that, contrary to expectations, the
macro motivations of overcapacity and developed-country customer
markets ultimately have a pro-worker effect.
On the other hand, it is not at all clear that the exclusion of workers in
general, and developing-country workers in particular, from the good faith
standard is close enough to the tipping point to be modified easily.

Although the good faith norm among multinationals appears robust'
despite challenges,"' that does not mean that there is a push to extend the
standard to a new group.'" Because people vastly overestimate the value
of short-term gains,' the multinationals will tend to value highly the
ability to reduce the hub's costs by foisting them on suppliers, even if the
consequence is worsening conditions for the workers. Thus, the
multinationals will tend to exclude developing-country workers from the
good faith norm. In confirmation, the multinationals have so far
consistently excluded developing-country workers, as evidenced by
repeated stories of abuse."'

The intuition that the exclusionary norm rests far from the tipping point
is further supported by the well-known psychology of loss. I would sell a
possession only for a price much higher than I would pay to buy the exact
same item, because giving up the item is perceived as a loss.1 7 The
multinationals' foot-dragging suggests that they frame the extension of
good faith as their loss and the developing-country workers' advantage. In

182. The sense of fairness embodied in the lex mercatoria has survived for centuries. Berman
& Kaufman, supra note 92, at 225 (regarding fairness and the long-lived lex mercatoria).
183. A well-respected, traditional analyst of good faith clearly believes that defectors exist;
they are the ones who act in "bad faith." Summers, supra note 126, at 196, 206 (considering
examples of commercial bad faith). Professor Summers specifically refers to "openly abusing the
power to break off negotiations" as an example of legally proscribed bad faith. Id. at 210, 212.
184. Some multinationals, particularly in the early stages of the transition, may choose to
behave opportunistically. See generallysupranote49.Ifthey push hard enough, far from extending
the good faith norm to workers, they can succeed in replacing it even among multinationals.
AXELROD, supra note 51, at 160-63 (discussing multiparty game theory). The fact that
multinationals may harm themselves in the long-term by continuing to treat developing-country
workers opportunistically as these workers gain power, whether as workers during a time of labor
shortage or as customers during a time of overcapacity, will not necessarily constrain the
multinationals to protect, let alone extend, the good faith norm.
185. FRANK, supra note 151, at 86 (suggesting that a dieter will eat the immediately available
German chocolate cake because the pain of subsequent dieting, although later to be regretted, is too
heavily discounted).
186. See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text.
187. Daniel Kahneman & Carol Varey, Notes on the Psychologyof Utility, in INTERPmERSONAL
COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 127, 150-51 (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991); see also
BRIANSKYRMS,EVOLUTIONOFTHESOCIALCONTRACT76-77(I 996) (discussing the sale versus the
acquisition of mugs).
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other words, the multinationals see norm defection (extending the good
faith norm to workers) as the loss of ability to gain at the suppliers' and
workers' expense."' I am not proposing that the multinationals be given
the possibility to purchase the ability to abuse workers, and thus the
analogy to the salable possession is imperfect." 9 Nevertheless, if the

multinationals were to see the extension of the good faith norm not as a
loss but as a means of gaining a solution to a problem of overcapacity or
to the problem of bad publicity in the developed-country customer
market, 9° then the extension ofthe good faith norm could be framed as the
multinationals' acquisition of a benefit. The norm would then be more
easily extended to the developing-country workers.
However, as the issue is articulated, it will likely not be easy to extend
the good faith norm to workers. The very fact of the multinationals' and
their suppliers' callous treatment of developing-country workers and the
fact of the relatively specific and grudgingly incremental improvements
proposed by the multinationals are consistent with the kind of footdragging predicted by the virtual organizations' distance-enhancing
structure. It is in the multinational hubs' perceived short-term self-interest
to shove as many costs as possible onto their suppliers, and it is in the
suppliers' self-interest to keep their own costs to a minimum. 9 '
What is the remedy? As suggested, part of the effort during the
transition period must be to reframe the issue for the multinationals so that
they perceive any enhancement and extension of the good faith norm as a
gain rather than a loss, and a relatively immediate gain at that. Second,
because of the probable difficulty in extending the norm here, the pressure
must be strong and persistent. Whatever the difficulty, the norm-defectors
seeking to expand the good faith norm will succeed if they apply
continuous pressure until they have pushed the norm to the tipping point,
at which moment a small additional effort will spread the new

188. Note also that a very small but immediate cost can have a huge deterrent effect, even over
a habit such as drinking. FRANK, supra note 153, at 87-88.
189. The ability to purchase the right to act opportunistically arguably is similar to emissions
trading, but I would argue that opportunism is more like a poison whose emission is not to be
tolerated than like a pollutant "whose appropriate emission[] level is well above zero." Cass R.
Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.L 607, 635. For early support of emissions
trading, see Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where DidAll the MarketsGo? An Analysis of
EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109 (1989).

190. Third-party monitoring is designed to escalate the effects of bad publicity. See Business
Ethics; Sweatshop Wars, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1999, at 62 (discussing monitoring by
independent activists, Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, Ernst & Young, and KPMG, including for
SA8000 certificates); infra note 241 (discussing the Council on Economic Priorities Social
Accountability 8000 certificate). Removing the likelihood of bad publicity if the multinationals
conform is negative reinforcement and a powerful motivator. See MYERS, supranote 155, at 305.
191. See generallysupra notes 48-57.
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expansionary good faith norm exponentially. 92 The norm-entrepreneurs
need a structure to combat the existing norms and the countervailing
structure of virtual organizations.
Still in the conceptual arena, one final cautionary note before we
proceed. Norm entrepreneurship is interference in the markets, at least
until the new norm is fully established. To the extent that advertisers are
creating demand for a product, even the most libertarian law and
economics scholars should not object. 193 However, to the extent that the
norm entrepreneurship is both top-down and imposed by someone other
than a market actor, and especially if that person or entity is governmental
or quasi-governmental, the efforts to modify the norm will bear a striking

resemblance to regulation, which is anathema to the more doctrinaire law
and economics scholars.'94 The structure proposed below, however, is top-

down but not mandatory, even in the transition period. The goal is to use
a relativist-inspired implementation of a universally observed norm, and
to do so by including the vulnerable parties prior to implementation in
order to side-step the universalism-relativism quagmire.'95
B. External-SourceRegulationDuringthe Transition:Taxonomy
We seek to extend the community's good faith norm to developingcountry workers in a context where extralegal incentives have proven
inadequate. The purpose is to have those workers involved at the
implementation stage of a universal norm, here the elimination of child
labor.

192. See supra note 171.
193. Libertarians should not object because they believe in relatively untrammeled freedom
of contract. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out ofFiduciaryDuties:A Response to
the Anti-Contractarians,65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 71-72 (1990) (arguing that freedom of contract is
preferable to mandatory terms for business associations); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Contract and FiduciaryDuty, 36 LL. & ECoN. 425, 445-46 (1993) (suggesting that
fiduciary duties are merely presumptive contract terms). See generally J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom
of Contract,FiduciaryDuties, andPartnerships:The BargainPrincipleand the Law ofAgency,
54 WASH. &LEEL.REv.439 (1997). Specifically withregardto thegood faith norm, some disagree
with that view. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 126, at 970-78 (absent fiduciary duty, the more
powerful are permitted to harm the more vulnerable). In any event, even the lawyer-economists
limit freedom of contract when the behavior becomes opportunistic. See supranote 49.
194. See generally Butler & Ribstein, supra note 193; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, The CorporateContract,89COLUM.L.REv. 1416,1426 (1989) (suggesting that objections
to regulation reflect objections to mandatory fiduciary duty).
195. See supra Part II.B. (discussing the relativism-universalism debate); supra note 16
(suggesting that workers have borne the brunt). I am indebted to Professor Lynne L. Dallas for the
suggestion that the top-down, optional code, because it is optional, is not market interference. For
the discussion of the top-down, optional code, see infra Parts IV.B.2.a. & IV.C.
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However, before we begin a discussion of different external sources of
norm-entrepreneurship for the transition period, we must have a useful
vocabulary. Thus, I am first offering a new taxonomy for codes of conduct,
a taxonomy that will both highlight the issues we have been discussing and
provide the tools to develop a new structure. The existing vocabulary that
distinguishes only between "unilateral" and "voluntary"' 96 is too limited
and too vague, although, as I mentioned in the introduction,'97 the
multinationals do, at least in a sense, generate codes of conduct
unilaterally. There are two reasons why the trait ional terms are
inadequate. 98 First, those words ask whether the enterprise that
promulgates the code of conduct, for example Nike or Wal-Mart, acted
unilaterally or voluntarily, instead of focusing on the customers' pressure
on the hub. In contrast, I describe codes of conduct as market-driven or
top-down, concentrating on the source of the pressure imposed on the
multinational enterprise, that is, on the prompt for the multinational to
adopt the code. By identifying the source of the power, we identify the
source of the current social influence.'" The terms "unilateral" and
"voluntary" instead imply that the multinational enterprise is autonomous.
Codes are also sometimes referred to as "non-binding." 2 ' I find it more
useful to consider whether these codes of conduct are mandatory or
optional, thus focusing on whether the hub can choose whether to
promulgate a particular code. In contrast, "non-binding" is a blunt
instrument that does not target the pressure on the code-promulgator. For
example, "non-binding" appears to cover only codes that are not technical
obligations, but without determining the kind of influence, social or
economic, that prompted that code.20'

196. See Sarah H. Cleveland, GlobalLaborRights andthe Alien Tort ClaimsAct, 76TEX. L.

REV. 1533, 1550-51 (1998) (referring to, inter alia,the Nike and Levi Strauss codes).
197. See supraPart 1.
198. See Manufacturing: Nike Announces New Labor Initiativesfor Foreign Plants to
Respond to Critics,DAILY LAB. REPT., May 13, 1998, at A3 (describing the Apparel Industry
Partnership's Code of Conduct as "voluntary"); see also Lance Compa, InternationalLabor
StandardsandInstruments ofRecoursefor Working Women, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 151,167 (1992);
Nicholas A. Robinson, Comparative Environmental Law Perspectives on Legal Regimes for
SustainableDevelopment,3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 247,270 (1998) (describing the 1991 Business

Charter for Sustainable Development ofthe nongovernmental International Chamber of Commerce
as a "voluntary code of conduct").

199. The multinationals pay attention to their customer-markets, being people whose approval
they seek. See supra notes 8 & 44 (suggesting that multinationals adopted codes under pressure

from their customers). See also TURNER, supranote 19, at 5-6.
200. That term is used, for example, to describe only the codes adopted by private enterprises.
Raj Bhala, Clarifyingthe Trade-LaborLink;37 CoLuM.J.TRANSNAT'LL. 11, 35 n.79 (1998). This
article focuses on "non-binding" rather than on "binding" codes precisely because it concentrates

on the values reflected rather than on enforcement.
201. Id See infra Part IV.B.2. for the distinction between mandatory and optional top-down
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As we review the different categories of codes of conduct, remember
that we are seeking a mechanism to level the playing field by supporting
the good faith norm as it facilitates a dialogue between the multinationals
and the developing-nation workers. Thus, the mechanism must be sensitive
to the affected workers and, to the extent possible, it must make itself
palatable to the multinationals.
1. Market-Driven, Optional Codes of Conduct
Turning first to market-driven, optional codes, the Nike code of
conduct is "market-driven" because Nike is indeed influenced by its
perception of industrialized-country customers when establishing the
standards for the suppliers' treatment of developing-nation workers. In
other words, Nike's behavior is "unilateral" or "voluntary" only in the
sense that there is no supranational, state, or parastatal organism requiring
adoption of the code,202 and there is not even a single, identifiable norm
entrepreneur 3 imposing, in effect, obligations from above.2 Again, the
reference to organisms requiring adoption or entrepreneurs imposing
obligations is not for the purpose of focusing on enforceability; this
discussion is only to describe the source of the power, the source of the
expression of values. The term "market-driven" confirms that the only
easily identified source of the code is the multinational itself. The
alternative is to address the amorphous market.
However amorphous, the customer market can have an impact as
evidenced by the Wal-Mart/Bangladesh illustration, but it is indirect since
codes.
202. See Cleveland, supra note 196, at 1550-51 (referring to, inter alia,the Nike and Levi
Strauss codes).
203. For example, Marc Kasky, a local activist sued Nike, accusing the company ofviolating
California's consumer laws by misleading the public about the working conditions of developingnation employees of Nike's suppliers. Nike Accused ofLyingAboutAsian Factories,N.Y. TIMES,

Apr. 21, 1998, at A18. Marion Traub-Wemer and her 25-member Nike Awareness Committee
sought to put pressure on Nike, with the result that Nike invited them to tour Nike's factories in
Vietnam. Harvey Araton, Athletes Toe the Nike Line, But Students Apply Pressure,N.Y. TIMES,

Nov. 22, 1997, at C3.
204. The first Nike code predated the Apparel Industry Partnership. PamelaM. Prah, Clinton
Endorses Plan to Curb Sweatshops Through Using Code of Conduct, Monitoring,DAILY LAB.
REP., Apr. 15, 1997, at Al; see also Nike Announces New LaborInitiativesfor ForeignPlantsto
Respond to Critics,DAILY LAB. REP. May 13, 1998, A3 (reporting that a Nike chief executive
officer confirmed that its code of conduct is being updated and refers to the Apparel Industry

Partnership model code); Nike Employing Andrew Young, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1997, at D2
(reporting that Nike first developed its code of conduct in 1992); ILAB/DOL, supra note 5
(describing the Wal-Mart code); supra note 8 (describing the Levi Strauss code); Citizen Shell,

supra note 8, at A14 (noting that Levi Strauss wrote the first code of conduct in 1991). For further
discussion of the Apparel Industry Partnership as itself a market-driven, optional code, see infra
text accompanying notes 218-19.
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it is the multinationals' behavior, not the market's behavior, that is directly
at issue. One risk is that the vehicle used to reach the market, the media in
the case of Wal-Mart/Bangladesh, will consider only part of the story." 5
Thus, we focus on the multinational,
and an appeal to a developed-country
2°
customer market is a last resort. 6
By definition, the market-driven code is optional from the perspective
of the virtual organization's hub, Wal-Mart or Nike in our examples." 7 A
market-driven code cannot be mandatory strictly speaking, because no
higher authority mandates compliance; the hub chooses whether to
conform. "Market driven" and "optional" do not mean "free from
pressure." However, they do mean free from concerted, focused pressure,
and they do mean free from legally enforceable pressure.
This market-driven, optional code is thus supremely egocentric; the hub
adopts it because it chooses to do so under the circumstances it perceives.
The hub expects to derive an advantage from the code, typically a publicrelations benefit vis-&-vis its customers. 2° ' Because such a code imposes
industrialized-country perceptions on developing nations, it exacerbates
the universalism problem with consequences such as the WalMart/Bangladesh disaster described in the introduction. It also reinforces
the multinational's focus on its own perception of its own preferences, thus
potentially reinforcing an instinct that any change is experienced as a loss
and is thus to be avoided.
Indeed, even after the multinationals instituted their first responses to
publicity about debacles such as Wal-Mart's in Bangladesh, it was years
before additional pressure convinced certain of them to include education

205. In the Wal-Mart/Bangladesh example, the mediaplayed up the horrors ofchild labor, but

not the children's need of work. See Hayes, supra note 1 (discussing only the horrors). More
ambiguously, after being criticized because blouses bearing her trademark (to be marketed by WalMart) had been manufactured by 13- and 14-year-olds in Honduras working 20 hour days, Kathie
Lee Gifford noted that 14-year-olds can work legally in Honduras, and that the minimum wage
there is $0.31 per hour. Strom, supra note 16, at D1.

206. As an analogy, the model for derivative actions is first to ask the board of directors to
modify an undesirable policy, and only if that fails does the norm-entrepreneur pass to the more
expensive action, analogous to an appeal to the shareholders. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Book Review,
The FolkloreofAmerican Capitalism,95 MICH. L. REV. 1970,1976 (1997) (describing proxy fights

as expensive).
207. I am focusing here on Nike's code ofconduct ratherthan Wal-Mart's because the Andrew
Young report on Nike's code of conduct provides much useful factual information, as do the
subsequent reports on the Young report. See Young's Report, supranote 27; O'Rourke, supranote
115; Derek Calzini et al., Nike, Inc.: Survey of Vietnamese and Indonesian Domestic Expenditure
Levels, (Nov. 3, 1997), at http://www.rpi.edul-huntk/tuck/dartnouth.html (providing the

Transnational Resource and Action Center's critique of the October 16, 1997 Dartmouth Report
on Nike).
208. Seesupranotes 8,40, & 44 (discussing the motives ofWal-Mart andNike).Seegenerally
supraPart II.A. (discussing the motives of hubs).
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as part of their program for child workers. On the one hand, Levi Strauss,
the first multinational enterprise to adopt a code of conduct, 2 9 does
expressly refer to underage Bangladeshi children.21° The company asserts
that it has worked with its suppliers to convince them not to fire the child
workers. The suppliers have continued to pay a salary on condition that the
children go to school,2 and the suppliers have also promised that there
would be a job for those children "after the completion of their
schooling."2 2 For its part, Levi Strauss (the hub) pays for "tuition, books,
and school uniforms."213 Nike, on the other hand, provides no real
analogue. Although it has had a code of conduct since 1992,214 although it
touts the code as evidence that it accepts responsibility, 2 5 and although its
chief executive officer speaks of establishing free education classes, 216 the
company introduced a commitment to provide education only years later,
and even then only by region.217
This difference in multinational response to similar working conditions
confirms the limitations of the market-driven, optional code of conduct.
While the codes may be moving toward a more worker-sensitive approach,
it is by increments and serendipity. The recently-formed Apparel Industry
Partnership similarly reflects these limitations.2 Despite the White
House's involvement in it, the Partnership is essentially a market-driven,
optional code; prominent retailers and manufacturers, including Nike,
organized the Partnership in 1996 after significant jaw-boning by President
209. See supra note 8; Nike Employing Andrew Young, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 1997, at D2
(reporting that Nike first developed its code of conduct in 1992); Prah, supranote 204 (reporting
that the Apparel Industry Partnership was formed in 1996).
210. See Levi Strauss, supra note 8.
211. See infra notes 263-65 (discussing the importance of education).
212. Levi Strauss, supranote 8.
213. Id Levi Strauss is privately owned; Robert D. Haas, a great-great grandnephew of
company founder Levi Strauss, is Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer. Id. Nike is
a public company. Both would be susceptible to market forces, but the impact of shareholders
presumably is different.
214. See supranote 8.
215. The Nike Code of Conduct, athttp://www.ementre.com/textil/corporate/nikccode.htm
(last visited July 15, 2001) (describing that the "[r]esponsibility of a global enterprise [is t]o do
what is expected of a leader by participating in the betterment of people's lives through sport and
fitness").
216. Nike Vows to Improve Working Condition in Asia (May 13, 1998), at
http://nikebiz.com/labor/prlabor2.shtml.
217. The Nike Code of Conduct, supranote 215; see also Young's Report, supranote 27. In
1998 Nike began a voluntary free education program for workers in the company's Indonesian
factories. The company has committed to order only from factories that offered education programs
by 2002. Nike Launches Education Program for Indonesian Factory Workers, June 2, 1998, at
http://nikebiz.com/medialnedlaunch.shtml.
218. See Prah, supranote 204. In 1999, the partnership organized the Fair Labor Association,
essentially as a monitoring arm. However, monitoring is not the focus of this Article.
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Clinton." 9 Concern for workers is not necessarily the motivating force;
uniformity of codes may be an advantage to multinationals in the same
industry as it can describe a minimum threshold of behavior that then
becomes the industry target.0 In any event, the manufacturers did not
embrace the Partnership's principles. It took the individual members of the
Partnership eighteen months to agree on a monitoring system? 1
2. Top-Down, Mandatory or Optional Codes of Conduct
In contrast to "market-driven" codes, "top-down" codes of conduct
reflect more than amorphous pressure, although they can be either
mandatory or optional as received by the multinational. While top-down,
mandatory codes are, as we will see, enforceable in the traditional sense of
having a governmental or parastatal power behind them, we still are not
focusing on enforceability. Rather, the significance of a top-down code
being mandatory rather than optional is that, while both styles of top-down
code have an easily identifiable source, it is relatively more important to
obtain the source's consent to any change in a mandatory code. Again, the
focus is on the source of the code--on the source of the underlying values.
a. Top-down, Mandatory Codes of Conduct
Top-down, mandatory codes are imposed by the state. The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) ' is an example of a code that is
enforced.' A top-down mandatory code also can be imposed by a
supranational organization, such as through a self-executing, or ratified and
statutorily implemented international agreement or treaty. 4 The new and

219. let The Partnership could be viewed as atop-down, optional code with President Clinton
as the norm entrepreneur. See infranote 241. However, it is probably an exaggeration of President
Clinton's focus and influence to compare him to the Reverend Sullivan. See generally infra Part
IV.B.2.b. (discussing the Reverend Sullivan's role).
220. For a discussion of the effect on competitive advantage of offering only a floor and not

a ceiling on acceptable behavior, see infra notes 282-86.
221. For example, it took 18 months for the Apparel Industry Partnership to form the
monitoring

arm,

the

Fair

Labor

Association.

Apparel

Industry

Partnership,

at

http://www.lchr.orglsweatshop/summary.htm (last visited July 15, 2001).
222. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2; see generally Compa, supra note 198, at 164. Also,

compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I and 78dd-2 prior to the amendments of PL 105-366, which applied
the statute to, respectively, issuers and domestic concerns, and prohibited certain dealings with,
inter alia,foreign officials or foreign political parties.
223. See JEFFREY P. BIALOS& GREGORY HUSISUAN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPTPRACTICEs ACT:
COPING WITHCORRUPTIONINTRANSrrONALECONOMIE 26(1996)(discussing a$21.8 million fine
and $3 million civil settlement paid by Lockheed).
224. E.g., Convention for Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, 37 l.L.M. 1 (1998); International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act
of 1998, PL 105-366 (Nov. 10, 1998) (amending FCPA to conform to the OECD Convention).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

43

Florida Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 1
654

FLORIDA LAW REP7EW

(Vol. 53

newly ratified OECD anti-bribery convention is an example of such a
code, 5 because Congress has implemented it for the United States by
amending the FCPA?26
We have already seen the egocentricity of the market-driven, optional
codes. 227 That egocentricity means universalism, the industrialized-country
values of the multinational enterprises' market, at the expense of
relativism. It also means that the multinationals are responding to a
particularly narrow view of their self-interest, making it more likely that
they would view the loss of advantage as just that, a loss. That, in turn,
suggests that it will be particularly difficult to obtain the multinationals'
cooperation to any change.?'
Consider, then, the top-down, mandatory codes as a possible choice for
the transitional period. These also tend toward the universalist because
they reflect predominantly the values and knowledge of the state or entity
promulgating those codes. It is not by accident that the anti-bribery code
came out of the OECD, disproportionately a group ofthe richest nations. 9
It is not by accident that the United States adopted the FCPA and then
pushed hard for the OECD convention. It is cheaper for companies of
industrialized-country nations not to have to pay bribes at all; therefore,
both the OECD and the United States are seeking to eliminate the
competitive advantage of bribing by attacking the supply side and
preventing all industrialized-country enterprises from bribing. 2'0
In addition, multinational enterprises based in the United States have
been at a particular disadvantage because the FCPA applies specifically to
prevent these multinational enterprises from bribing." Multiple efforts by

225. See supranote 224.

226. See supranote 224.
227. See supranote 208 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 187-88 (discussing the difficulty of changing a market-driven, optional
norm when the multinational has framed any change as a loss).
229. See Douglass Cassel, CorporateInitiatives:A Second Human Rights Revolution?, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L.i. 1963, 1970 (1996). In the context of foreign policy issues, Professor Stephan
describes the United States as "possessed of the largest and most developed national economy as
well as unchallenged strategic power." Paul B. Stephan, Creative Destruction-Idiosyncratic
Claims of InternationalLaw andthe Helms-Burton Legislation, 27 STETSON L. REV. 1341, 1343
(1998); see also David A. Gantz, GlobalizingSanctionsAgainstForeignBribery: The Emergence
ofa New InternationalLegal Consensus, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 457,495 (1998). See generally
Melissa Hurst, EliminatingBribery in InternationalBusiness Transactions,6 J. INT'L L. & PRAC.

111, 114-16 (1997) (noting that bribery affects mostly the wealthiest nations).
230. See Jong Bum Kim, Korean Implementation of the OECD Bribery Convention:
Implicationsfor Global Efforts to FightCorruption, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 245, 274 (2000)

("The OECD Bribery Convention. .. deals only with active bribery or the supply side of
corruption....").
231. The reach of the FCPA is beyond the United States hub and on to the activities of the
foreign subsidiaries. See Michael R. Geroe, Complying With U.S. AntibriberyLaws,31 INT'L LAW.
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these enterprises to repeal the FCPA have failed," 3 despite a loss of
business opportunities estimated by our then-U.S. Trade Representative at
$45 billion in 1994 alone. 4 Thus, the United States and the OECD
focused on their own interests in formulating the top-down, mandatory
code that is the OECD convention rather than on the developing-nation
community that is directly affected. 5 To the extent that these
governmental and parastatal organisms fail to recognize the developingcountry workers' needs, the top-down, mandatory codes will pattern
behavior insensitive to workers. 6
b. Top-down, Optional Codes of Conduct
Top-down, optional codes are optional in the sense that compliance is
not mandatory, but these codes reflect far greater and more focused
pressure than do the market-driven codes triggered, in the case of WalMart and Nike, by relatively unorganized customers. Top-down, optional
codes include, for example, the anti-apartheid Sullivan Principles." 7 These

1037,1038 (1997) (explaining that United States multinational enterprises maybe vicariously liable
for actions of their foreign subsidiaries). Concerning agency liability, see 15 U.S.C. § 78dd2(hX3XA) (2001).
232. See Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning ofSchmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign
CorruptPracticesAct on Its Twentieth Birthday, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 269, 279 (1998)
(relating how United States multinational enterprises sought repeal).
233. Lisa Harriman Randall, Note, Multilateralizationof the ForeignCorruptPracticesAct,
6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 657,669 n.53 (1997) (describing multiple efforts to repeal or amend
FCPA). One recent modification even extended the reach of FCPA to lower-level employees and
agents. Arthur F. Mathews, DefendingSECandDOJForeignCorruptPracticesAct Investigations
and Conducting Related CorporateInternalInvestigations: The Triton Energy/IndonesiaSEC
Consent Decree Settlements, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 303, 322-23 (1998).
234. Paul Lewis, CorruptionIs Now Under GlobalAttack, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Nov. 29,
1996, at 5B. The source for then-Representative Mickey Kantor's estimates was the Central
Intelligence Agency.
235. Kenneth U. Surdadinata, Comment, Revisiting Corrupt Practices from a Market
Perspective, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1021, 1034-35 (1998).

236. See TURNER, supra note 19, at 44, 132 (discussing compliance, influence and power).
There are other concerns, too, with atop-down, mandatory system, I.e. with a rules-based system.
See generallyDuncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARv. L.
REV. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976) (comparing standards and rules); Faith Stevelman Kahn,
TransparencyandAccountability:RethinkingCorporateFiduciaryLaw 'sRelevance toCorporate
Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REv. 505, 513-14 (2000) (discussing fiduciary law as a flexible alternative
to rules).
237. Sullivan Principles for U.S. Corporations Operating in South Africa (4th Amplification,
Nov. 8, 1984), 24 I.L.M. 1464, 1496 (1985). Originally, there was no legislative support for the
Principles. President Reagan's Executive Order 12532 (Sept. 9, 1985) did not order compliance
with the Sullivan Principles. 24 I.L.M. 1464, 1488 (providing the text of Order). However, the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. § 5001 (1988), did codify anti-apartheid
standards even more expansive than the Principles.
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Principles were designed by the Reverend Sullivanr 3 to pressure
investors, 9 who would and did then pressure the multinational enterprises
based in the United States.2' Top-down, optional codes also include the
precatory recommendations of the ILO as well as its conventions.24
That the recommendations and unratified conventions are optional is
clear; the only punishment for noncompliance is publication.242 As a
238. The Principles were originally developed in 1977 by Reverend Sullivan, who was at the
time a director of General Motors. Cassel, supranote 229, at 1970.
239. See Valerie Ann Zondorack, A New Face in CorporateEnvironmentalResponsibility:
The Valdez, 18 B.C. ENVTL. Aiv. L. REV. 457,477 (1991) (noting that universities signed on, as
did other institutional investors). Municipal pension funds are particularly susceptible. Daniel H.
Pink, The Valdez Principles:Is What's GoodforAmerica Goodfor GeneralMotors?, 8 YALEL.
&POL'YREv. 180, 184 (1990) (noting that the City of New York and the States of Connecticut and
Iowa restricted investments of their state employee pension funds to companies that complied with
the Sullivan Principles); see also Zondorack, supra at 479, n. 120. Reverend Sullivan abandoned
the Principles in 1987 because he considered them a failure. Cassel, supra note 229, at 1971.
Nevertheless, over a hundred companies signed the Principles, and many others withdrew from
South Africa altogether. l
240. Originally, there was no supporting legislation for the Principles, although the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. § 5001 (1988) did codify anti-apartheid
standards even more expansive than the Principles. See supranote 237; Zondorack, supranote 239,
at477 n.107 (considering pressure from students and prospective students); Pink, supranote 239,
at 183 (discussing compliance by signatories, including Exxon, IBM, Citicorp and Mobil).
Multinationals that did adhere to the Principles would no longer be at a competitive disadvantage
in South Africa. Zondorack, supranote 239, at 484 n. 148 (reporting that executives report a feeling
of solidarity with other compliant firms). The ILO has identified this issue of competitive
disadvantage. See International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) Practical
Action to Eliminate Child Labour, paperpresented at the International Conference on Child Labour,
Oslo, Norway (Oct. 27-30, 1997) [hereinafter ILO/IPEC Paper] (referring to the possible
"comparative advantage" of using child labor). IPEC is the ILO's International Programme on the
Elimination of Child Labour, a technical cooperation program on child labor. Thus Reverend
Sullivan could expect that the multinational enterprises would exhibit an increased willingness to
comply. In fact, Reverend Sullivan concluded that his Principles had failed. Cassel, supranote 229,
at 1971.
241. For example, President Reagan urged companies to comply with the Sullivan Principles,
but he did not mandate compliance by Executive Order. See supra note 237. In 1997, President
Clinton used the power of the White House to encourage representatives of the apparel industry to
join the Apparel Industry Partnership, a group of labor unionist, human rights advocates, and
apparel industry representatives. Prah, supranote 204. But see supranote 219 (querying the extent
of President Clinton's influence). See also The Convention Concerning the Prohibition and
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, ILO Convention 182,
adopted by the ILO Conference at its 87th Session on June 17, 1999, at
http'//www.ilo.org/publicenglish/1ic/ilc87/com-chic.htm (providing an example ofa top-down,
optional code because the only remedy is disclosure).
Perhaps the so-called SA 8000 standards of the Council on Economic Priorities Accreditation
Agency (CEPAA) are also top-down and self-imposed where adopted. However, because this article
concentrates on the definition of behaviors and norms while the CEPAA focuses on monitoring,
I will not discuss these standards.
242. International Labor Organization Constitution, art. 22, June 28, 1919,49 STAT. 2712, 15
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practical matter, moreover, even ratified conventions can be optional.
While the ILO has an intricate, formal enforcement process ultimately
leading to the International Court of Justice,243 the implementation of
ratified ILO conventions in fact occurs because of an elaborate system of
publicity and shaming. 2 " The drive to comply based on adverse publicity
is enhanced by the ILO's signature tripartite structure that includes
delegates from a country's government, from its most representative
worker group, and from its most representative employer group. 24
Whereas one government may be reluctant to criticize another, the
delegates selected by workers (or employers) instead of by the government
are not so inhibited.2' For reasons described below, I believe that the topdown, optional codes display the most flexibility and are thus the best
choice for the transitional structure.

U.N.T.S. 35, availableathttp://www.ilo.org(public/english/abouttiloconst.htm (last visited July31,
2001) (requiring an annual report to International Labor Office on efforts to implement); id., art.
23 (requiring the ILO's Director-General to report to the governing body on implementation
efforts). Conventions that have not been ratified are, of course, not binding. Recommendations are
also not binding. See Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link- Applying the InternationalTrading
Systems to Enforce Violations of Forced Child Labor, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 361, 383 (1995)

(explaining that recommendations are non-binding, and conventions become legally binding on an
ILO-member state only upon ratification); see also Jay M. Vogelson, American Bar Association
Section ofInternationalLaw andPractice,Reportto the House ofDelegates,InternationalLabor
Organization,30 INT'L LAW. 653, 655 (1996) (confirming that recommendations are not binding
and conventions are binding only on countries that ratify them).
243. International Labour Organization Constitution, art. 37 (referring to the International
Court of Justice); see Ehrenberg, supranote 242, at 388.
244. See Virginia A. Leary, Lessons from the Experience of the InternationalLabour
Organisation[sic], in THEUNIEDNATIONS ANDHUMAN RIGHTS 580, 598-601 (Philip Alston ed.
1992) (discussing publicity and shaming); Ehrenberg, supra note 242, at 388-89 (suggesting that
the ILO uses publicity and shaming, rarely uses contentious proceedings, and "[n]o material form
of sanctions has ever been utilized"). Ultimately, to enhance efforts against child labor, Professor
Ehrenberg recommends that the World Trade Organization's sanctions-mechanism bejoined to the
ILO. Ehrenberg, supranote 242, at 405. The ILO has not ever withdrawn its technical cooperation
programs in order to punish noncompliance. See Leary, supra at 607-08; Ehrenberg, supra note
242, at 390.
245. International Labour Organization Constitution, art. 3, § 5 ("The Members [the States]
undertake to nominate non-Government delegates and advisers chosen in agreement with the
industrial organizations, if such organizations exist, which are most representative of employers or
workpeople, as the case may be, in their respective countries."). In the U.S., the United States
Council for International Business represents employers and the American Federation of
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) represents workers. Vogelson, supranote
242, at 654 (discussing tripartite representation); see also Telephone conversation with Julie
Misner, International Relations Officer, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of
Labor (July 7, 1999) (stating that US workers are represented at the ILO by the AFL-CIO).
246. Leary, supra note 244, at 601 (suggesting that the tripartite form is an important reason
for the ILO's success in implementing its conventions); Ehrenberg, supra note 242, at 382 n.156
(emphasizing the importance of the delegates not selected by the governments).
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C. Top-Down, OptionalCodes of Conductas the TransitionalVehicle
Toward the Level PlayingField
As we remember, the goal is to include the developing-country workers
in dialogue in order to avoid the universalism-relativism impasse.247
Extralegal influences have proven ineffective, 2 " with disastrous results to
the workers, as exemplified by the consequences of Wal-Mart's marketdriven activities.249 The flavor of a code of conduct most likely to mimic
the good faith norm's inclusion of the vulnerable, even during the
transition period before the good faith norm truly has been extended to
workers, is the last category, the top-down but optional version.
Having in the prior subpart explained the shortcomings of the other
flavors of code, here I will first show, conceptually, why the top-down,
optional code is suited to the transition period. Next, I will use the ILO's
concrete and sophisticated effort to identify and implement pro-worker
values, an effort that nevertheless has been only partially successful, as a
focus for comment. An important attribute of the ILO is its emphasis on
spreading the pro-worker values articulated in its foundational
documents."5 In contrast, those who call for the intervention by, for
example, the World Trade Organization (WTO), are focused not on the
development and implementation of values, the subject of this Article, but
on the enforcement of values already embraced by those champions of the
WTO. 25 In other words, as we do here, historically the ILO has focused on
the identification and implementation of values, rather than on their
enforcement. 2

247. See supra Part II.B.
248. See supra Part I1.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 1-14.

250. The ILO's Constitution, Preamble, and Philadelphia Declaration all articulate support of
social justice. See generally infra note 258.
251. See Anna T. Johansson, A Silent Emergency Persists: The Limited Efficacy of US
Investment Sanctions on Burma, 9 PAC. RIM L. & PoL'Y J. 317, 340 (2000) (discussing human
rights in general); John T. Soma & Eric K. Weingarten, MultinationalEconomic Network Effects
and the Needfor an InternationalAntitrustResponsefiom the World Trade Organization:A Case
Study in Broadcast-MediaandNews Corporation,21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 41, 122-24 (2000)

(discussing antitrust). But see Howse, supranote 18, at 167-68 (suggesting that the WTO would
be an enforcer, but the ILO or another source might articulate the fundamental labor rights).
252. Even in its dealings with the WTO, the ILO appears to maintain its focus on the
establishment of fundamental rights. Press Release, International Labour Organization, DirectorGeneral

to Attend

WTO

Conference

in

Seattle, (Nov.

18,

1999),

available at

www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/1999/39.htm. SeegenerallyHowse,supranote 18, at 167
(discussing the possibility of the ILO proposing standards and the WTO enforcing them).
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1. Top-Down, Optional Codes as the Transitional VehicleThe Concept
It is possible for top-down, optional codes to be egocentric, just as are
the market-driven, optional codes. 3 However, because these are top-down
codes, the source ofthe power, and therefore the focus of the egocentricity,
is not the multinational or its customers. The Sullivan Principles were, for
example, the effort of a single, powerful norm entrepreneur; it was the
Reverend Sullivan's vision that dominated.'
Despite its egocentricity or, more precisely, because of its source, this
top-down, optional category seems empirically to have been particularly
sensitive to the impact on the ground. Thus, the top-down, optional codes
begin to model the enhanced good-faith standard by encouraging the
multinationals to listen to the workers. The Reverend Sullivan, after
consultations with black South Africans, including union leaders, decided
to pressure the multinationals to use their power within South Africa
against apartheid, instead of continuing to urge the multinationals to divest
South African assets. 5 Similarly, the ILO recommendations256 and
conventions"" relating to child labor, for example, also conform to the
good faith norm's concern for the vulnerable.2 s Especially during the past
253. Market-driven, optional codes encourage themultinationals'egocentricity. Seesupranote
208. In addition, the top-down, mandatory codes have an egocentric streak. Seesupranotes 229-35;
see also supranote 236 (discussing the disadvantages of rules-based systems generally); Hillary

A. Sale, Judging Heuristics 60 (2001) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (discussing
judges' heuristics and how rigid perspectives devolve into rules).
254. See supranote 238.
255. See Leon Sullivan, Agentsfor Change:The MobilizationofMultinationalCompaniesin
South Africa, 15 LAw&POL'YINT'L Bus. 427,428 (1983). Reverend Sullivan had first wanted the
multinationals to divest, but General Motors refused. See also Jorge F. Perez-Lopes, Promoting
InternationalRespectforWorkersRights ThroughBusiness Codes ofConduct, 17FORDHAMINT'L
L.J. 1, 6 (1993) (referring to Reverend Sullivan's discussions with black South Africans, including
union leaders). The mandatory, top-down codes focus on the interest ofthe source of power, in that
case, the implementing national government See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
256. See Ehrenberg, supranote 242, at 383.
257. See, for example, Convention No. 138 concerning minimum age for admission to
employment, which was not approved by the U.S. Senate because it was found that it was
inconsistent with U.S. law and practice. Report of the Tripartite Advisory Panel on International
Labor Standards Regarding Convention 150, 1978 WL 41354, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-26 (1978).
258. International Labour Organization Constitution, Preamble ("The High Contracting
Parties, moved by sentiments of justice and humanity as well as by the desire to secure the
permanent peace of the world... agree to the following Constitution of the International Labour
Organization."); see also the declaration concerning the aims and purpose of the ILO (also known
as the "Philadelphia Declaration") adopted in 1944 as, essentially, a reaffirmation of the
Constitution. See also International Labour Organization, Report VII, Part II, delivered at the
International Labour Conference (June 1998) commenting that "fundamental rights are not
fundamental because the [draft] Declaration says so; the Declaration says that they are fundamental
because they are.").
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decade, the ILO has worked very hard259 to include the voice of the
developing-nation workers and their families.2" It has done so significantly
by incorporating the voices of non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
independent, private associations that can bring differing perspectives.26
This does not mean that the ILO is without universalist tendencies. To the
contrary, it has a long history ofpromoting absolute standards. 2 However,
recent studies and recommendations of the ILO emphasize the importance

259. See, e.g., ILO Final Report, supra note 87 (referring to the need for national, that is to
say, relatively local, legislation).
260. See supranote 245 and accompanying text; Ehrenberg, supra note 242, at 382-83.
261. NGOs are variously defined, but include "private organizations... not established by a
government or by an international agreement, which are capable of playing a role in international
affairs by virtue of their activities." Martin A. Olz, Non-GovernmentalOrganizationsin Regional
Human Rights Systems, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 307, 317 (1997). More broadly, the term
can include any organization as long as its "'private' character is unquestionable," sometimes even
including "groups which are established and active in a single country and rely solely on the
domestic legal order." Id. at 320. Thus, while NGOs do not have a personality under classic
international law, they have sought to be effective in the international arena by exercising the type
of legal and political influence that citizens do in the United States when they have standing to
intervene. A. Dan Tarlock, The Role ofNon-Governmental Organizationsin the Development of
InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 68 CHL.-KENT L. REV. 61, 64 (1992).
When I speak of NGOs whose voices are included by the ILO, I do not refer to the labor and
employer associations represented before the ILO. Only the representatives authorized by the ILO
Constitution have such consultative status. International Labour Organization Constitution, art. 3;
see also Lance Compa, The MultilateralAgreementonInvestment andInternationalLaborRights:
A Failed Connection, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 683, 706-07 (1998). For the United States, for
example, the worker-representatives are chosen by the AFL-CIO. See supra note 248. Some
observers do consider such worker-representatives, for instance, to be NGOs. Olz, supra at 324
(considering labor and employer associations as NGOs); see also David Weissbrodt, The Role of
InternationalNongovernmental Organizationsin the Implementation ofHuman Rights, 12 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 293, 295-96 (1977) (referring to NGOs with a consultative status before the ILO).
However, I am referring to unrelated NGOs. These, too, can have a significant hearing before the
ILO. See Nicolas Valticos, Once More About the ILO System ofSupervision: In What Respect Is
It Still a Model?, in I TOwARDs MORE EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION BY INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 99, 101-02 (Niels Blokker & Sam Muller eds., 1994); see also Katherine E. Cox,
The Inevitability of Nimble Fingers? Law, Development, and Child Labor, 32 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 115, 158 (1999) (explaining that theNational Research Centre in India collaborates
with, inter alia,the ILO and has established a network of NGOs); Feisal Hussain Naqvi, People's
Rights or Victim's Rights: Reexamining the Conceptualization of Indigenous Rights in
InternationalLaw, 71 IND. L.J. 673, 711 (1996) (explaining that NGOs have participated actively
with the ILO); Russel Lawrence Barsh, An Advocate's Guide to the Conventionon Indigenousand
TribalPeoples,15 OKLA. CrrYU. L. REv. 209,210 (1990) (discussing how NGOs convinced ILO
to reconsider the language of the ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (No. 107)).
262. On the ILO's universalist tendencies, see supra note 258; see also Virginia Leary, The
Paradox of Workers' Rights As Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONALTRADE22, 36-38 (Lance C. Compa& Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996) (discussing
a Dutch report that analyzed the extent to which countries actually conform to specified ILOdescribed standards).
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ofempowering peoples263 and, specifically, of educating workers and their
families. Educated workers are more likely to know what questions to ask
and what the alternatives are, and thus are less likely to be Obused. 2"
Further, educated families are less likely to place their children in abusive
working situations. 265
The ILO's use of the NGOs, when it works correctly, has the workers
speaking by proxy through the NGOs. 26' To the extent that the workers'
voices are heard, the volume of the relativism-universalism debate is
turned down because the workers in their own community can describe the
detail of how the values should be implemented. Simply promoting
dismissal of child workers in Bangladesh will not further the extension of
good faith values when the result is that the hubs' actions leave the
developing-country workers even more vulnerable than before. 267 When
workers speak for themselves, the relativism-universalism debate becomes
irrelevant; there no longer is an imposition of values from the
industrialized world on workers in a developing country.
What the ILO can do through the NGOs is facilitate, and doubtless
influence, 268 the multinationals' extension of the good faith norm to
workers. In this connection, there are problems of process because NGOs
are basically unregulated, and even the ILO recognizes that many are too

263. See Barsh, supranote 261, at 210. In 1986, the ILO, through its experts, rejected what
it asserted to be ILO Convention No. 107's "integrationist approach" and recommended that
indigenous peoples "should enjoy as much control as possible over their own economic, social and
cultural development." Naqvi, supranote 261, at 711.
264. ILO/IPEC Paper, supranote 240, para. 36 (discussing the value of education); see also
DASGUPTA, supra note 85, at 541 (focusing specifically on the education of girls).
265. ILO/IPEC Paper, supra note 240, para. 36. This being the ILO, it also proposes to
empower workers by encouraging an environment for effective collective bargaining. See supra
note 245; Ehrenberg, supra note 242, at 382-83.
266. The importance ofthe NGOs as communicators of local knowledge is expressly accepted
by the ILO. ILO/IPEC Paper, supranote 240, art2 (referring to the importance ofNGOs because
their "[c]lose proximity to, and insider knowledge... have allowed them in many instances better
than any other group to develop and conduct concrete activities which meet the need of working
children and their families"); see also id para. 94 (praising an NGO, the South Asian Coalition
against Child Servitude); Trubek et al., supra note 89, at 1193 (suggesting, in the context of
national systems rather than NGOs, a "bottom-up" approach to put "pressures on corporations to
create codes of conduct covering labor conditions").
267. For a discussion of the universalism-relativism debate, see supra Part II.C. For a
discussion ofthe good faith norm and vulnerability, see supranotes 127-31 and accompanying text.
268. ILO Final Report, supra note 87 (remembering that the avowed purpose is to change
assumptions about, in this case, child labor); seealso Ehrenberg, supranote242, at 382 (noting that
a "major drawback" of the ILO is its "its exclusive reliance on moral persuasion and similar
nonpunitive techniques," although there is an extensive reporting and supervisory system); Breen
Creighton, CombatingChildLabour: The Role ofInternationalLabourStandards, 18 COMP. LAB.
L.J. 362, 383-84 (1997) (concerning supervision).
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small and poorly managed to do the volume of work necessary. 269 They
also can reflect the views of their leader, rather than the voices of the
affected persons. ° However, the NGOs do show promise, especially if
selected by the 1LO or some other neutral organization, 2 ' as vehicles to
convey effectively the developing-workers' expressions of their needs.
The ILO is not perfect: there also are problems of focus specific to the
ILO. Because its delegates from the worker groups are to be the "most
representative" from each country," the workers typically are represented
by organized labor. 4 In contrast, workers in developing countries tend to
be unorganized.275 We have seen that the ILO is increasingly sensitive to
the developing-country workers by asserting, for example, the affirming
importance of education. 276 Nevertheless, the ILO's structure is not ideal
to represent effectively the interests of developing-country workers
precisely because unorganized workers are not directly and automatically
represented in ILO deliberations.'

269. ILO/IPEC Paper, supra note 240, art. 2, para. 21.
270. Claude E. Welch, Jr., Conclusion, in NGOs AND HUMAN RIGHTs 265-66 (Claude E.
Welch, Jr. ed., 2001).
271. See supranote 269. Enforcement, although not the focus of this piece, complicates the
issue. See supraPart I. (explaining why the focus is on discerning general and specific values and
not on enforcement). Statutes are easy; the FCPA is enforced. See, e.g., United States v. Lockheed
Corp., 94 CR 226-01 (N.D. Ga. June 22, 1994) (involving a guilty plea and almost S25 million in
fines and settlement). See generally BIALOs & HusisuAN, supranote 223, at 26 (noting that U.S.
Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission are increasing monitoring for
violations). Monitoring is an honored way of effecting enforcement. The ILO spends considerable
space discussing monitoring as a necessary component of codes of conduct. See International
Labour Office, supra note 258, at Part IV; ILO Final Report, supranote 87 (calling for legislation
by local governments, education of the local population, and, generally, mobilization of society).
272. See supra note 241 for a reference to CEPAA, an organization that focuses on
monitoring.
273. See supranote 245.
274. See supra note 245.
275. In the developing world, workers tend not to be "seasoned and organized." Frances Lee
Ansley, Rethinking Law in GlobalizatingLabor Markets, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 369, 371
(1998); see alsoJazmine Estacio, An EmergingAsianTiger ChasingtheAmericanDream: Labor,
PoliticsandEconomics in the Philippines, 16 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 88, 126 (1997) (suggesting
that the Philippines are unusual among developing countries because they have "remarkable
openness to organized labor").
276. See ILO/IPEC Paper, supra note 240, para. 36 (discussing how educated persons are
more aware of their own rights and how better educated parents have better educated, healthier
children).
277. The unions, and theiranalogues foremployers, are not, however, the only NGOs to which
the ILO listens. See supra note 261 (discussing the ILO's use of NGOs). Evidence does exist of
unions based in the United States helping foreign workers unionize. Trubek et al.,
supra note 89,
at 1207-08 (noting that a Coca-Colaplant and a Philips Van Hesen plant were unionized with the
help of a consortium of unions and activists).
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What the ILO does illustrate is that its evolution oftop-down, optional
codes is a direction that is coherent while gratifyingly flexible and
sensitive. The ILO, or another appropriate supranational organization, must
be an arbiter respected and neutral enough to be a credible norm
entrepreneur among multinationals, and the regulations themselves cannot
be rigidly enforceable because all voices, including those of the
developing-nation workers, must be carefully heard. As painful experience
has proved, those workers suffer when we rely instead on values
unilaterally imposed by an uninhibited power in a distant market place." 8
The use of the top-down, optional mechanism may help the
multinationals to see the changes resulting from the codes as a gain, and
even a short-term gain, rather than a loss, thus increasing the likelihood
that they will support such changes.2 9 The norm entrepreneur should
consciously frame the issue as a benefit for the multinationals by asserting
that extension of the norm can help the multinationals avoid a dramatic
(potential) disaster." Specifically, as developing-country workers and
their families and descendants become consumers, they may remember
how they have been treated, and multinationals with a record of tolerating
abusive work conditions will find future markets relatively closed to them,
and their overcapacity consequently relatively difficult to correct.O28 ' To be
sure, we have seen that, alone, overcapacity has not proven adequate to
extend the good faith norm to developing-country workers. However, the
possibility that this scenario will come to pass is a tool that a norm
entrepreneur such as the ILO could use.
Further, because the code is optional, the multinationals' voices, too,
will be part of the process. And, the more the multinationals are included
in that process, the more they will view the codes as damage control.
Although, initially, the multinationals may have to increase expenditures
278. Again, although enforcement is an important topic, it is beyond the scope of this Article.
See supra Part I. (focusing on discernment of general and specific values, not enforcement).
Enforcement of top-down, mandatory codes such as statutes is easy: the FCPA is enforced. See
supranote 271.
279. See supranotes 187-90.
280. SeeRICHARDNISBETT&LEEROSS, CENTURYPSYCHOLOGY SERIES 75(1980) (explaining

how the availability heuristic causes people to expect contrafactually that more deaths occur from
fire and accident than from drowning or stroke, because fire and accident are reported more
frequently in the media); see also Kirk Johnson, The Things PeopleChoose to Fear: Usually They
Are Unknown and Uncontrolled,Not Near and Dangerous,N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 2000, at 27
(reporting that uncontrollable disaster is much feared, at least in the United States).
281. See supranotes 136-48. The workers' memory maybe selective in a very different way;
Pepsi-Cola's decision to pull out of South Africa during apartheid has not sheltered it from worker
protests, while Coca-Cola, which divested by selling to a local subsidiary and thus stayed in the
market during apartheid, has not suffered similar protests. Liz Sly, Pepsi'sReturn to the New S.
Africa Turns Sour;DisappointedJobseekersLay Siege to Dream Plant,CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 1994,
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to conform to the new obligations to workers, there is perhaps less
likelihood of upside (expensive) defection than would be the case with a
purely market-driven, optional code.282 That is, with an ILO code,
multinationals may feel protected from having to offer even better working
conditions. The ILO has specifically recognized the pull of competitive
advantage, 283 and an ILO-sponsored effort to influence multinationals in
favor of pro-worker values by establishing minimum work conditions2
does not, of course, eliminate competitive advantage in the same way that
the OECD anti-bribery convention purportedly does.2" After all, the
OECD convention places both a floor and a ceiling on behavior by simply
prohibiting the payment of bribes to foreign officials,2 while the ILO
conventions place only a floor; the multinationals are invited to adopt
higher standards ofbehavior than those articulated by any ILO convention.
A multinational signatory can, without violating a working-condition
convention, offer better terms if, for example, it perceives a publicrelations advantage. However, if and to the extent that the ILO (or similar
structure) as norm entrepreneur has significant credibility, the terms it
supports may well, at least .nitially, be adopted.
I recognize the irony, of course, that this top-down, optional code may
prove to be a ceiling on improvements to working conditions, as well as
a floor. However, to the extent that the code provides a ceiling, the
multinationals may view it as a benefit, and thus be less resistant to the
code as a whole.287
Let us now see how a system of top-down, optional codes could have
avoided the disaster that Wal-Mart triggered in Bangladesh. For ease of
reference, I speak of the ILO as the promulgator of these codes, although,
as just noted, the ILO may have to extend its practical focus beyond
organized workers and increase its supervision of NGOs in order to
become maximally effective in this transitional role.

282. See supraPart IV.B.I.
283. ILO/IPEC Paper, supra note 240. Although the ILO uses the phrase "comparative

disadvantage," it really is speaking of "competitive disadvantage."
284. See ILO Convention 182, Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Elimination ofthe
Worst Forms of Child Labour, 38 I.L.M. 1207 (1999) (providing the most recent major
international convention concerning work conditions for children).
285. See David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Bribery: The Emergence ofa New
InternationalLegal Consensus, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 457,490 (1998).

286. See Convention for Combating Bribery, supra note 224.
287. See FRANK, supra note 151. To the extent that the supranational organization has
credibility. with developed-country customers, a standard which it supports and to which the
multinational has conformed can shelter the multinational in the event of bad publicity, thus acting
as a negative reinforcer. See MYERS, supra note 155, at 305 (discussing negative reinforcement).
This converts threatened punishment by the developed-country customer market into negative
reinforcement. See generallysupra Part III.B.2.
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2. Top-Down, Optional Codes as the Transitional VehicleThe Principle Applied
At their best, the NGOs serve as microphones for the workers during
the transition. The Bangladeshi workers clearly proved that paid
employment is of critical importance to them; after their dismissal at WalMart's behest, they accepted even more dangerous and demeaning jobs.288
Second, the ILO, through the intervention of the NGOs- appreciates that
education is vital to the workers,2 9 and would seek to communicate this
learning to multinationals that even today often fail to provide adequate
education to their workers." ° The NGOs will force the multinationals to
hear those facts, to hear that providing education to child workers may
attenuate the harm caused when the anti-child-labor value is implemented.
That is the first relativist step in implementing the assertedly universal
value. The relativism-universalism debate remains relevant even at this
level. How do the NGOs, or a supranational organization such as the ILO,
determine what values are taught to the workers during the education
process? That question again focuses on implementation. If the goal is to
level the playing field, the topics to be taught become more clearly
identifiable as those that will level the playing field by empowering
workers. The topics will inevitably include training for practical alternative
employment and, generally, learning about alternatives.29
Microphones are not enough, however. We have had microphones
before; that was the role played by NBC when it broadcast in the United
States the 1992 story about the Bangladeshi child workers producing goods
for Wal-Mart. 2 Norms articulated by an institution such as the ILO, after
listening to and hearing the workers express their own needs through the
NGOs, have a far better chance of taking into account the probable
consequences ofproposed responses to child labor. Such an institution will
understand that the Bangladeshi suppliers might well fire all child workers
on a warning that a substantial part of their export market may be closed
to them. First, that institution will know the context on the ground.293
Second, the NGOs' role is to consider the impact on the workers; unlike

288. See ILAB/DOL, supra note 1, at 7; see also supranote 15 and accompanying text. See
generally supranotes 1-14 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 263-65 (discussing the importance of education).
290. See supra notes 209-17 (noting that the Levi Strauss code of conduct, but not that of
Nike, provides for education of workers).
291. See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of education
to empowerment).
292. See supra note 1.
293. See supra note 266 (discussing NGOs as a source of information about the developing
country and its people).
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the multinationals, the NGOs, if properly selected, are not worried about
the perceptions of the industrialized-country market.M
This focuses the role of the supranational norm entrepreneur as it is
formulating and implementing a top-down, optional code. If the
supranational organization were, for example, the ILO, it would first
engage the NGOs on the one hand, and the multinationals on the other.
Assuming an anti-child-labor norm, the ILO would seek the eradication of
child labor by helping the multinationals to realize the articulated needs of
the developed-country workers.
The role of an institution such as the ILO would, however, be more
than to ensure the placement of the microphones and to verify the hearing
of the multinationals. From the perspective of a multinational such as WalMart, the ILO would also substitute itself for the industrialized-country
media as the norm entrepreneur of choice. Instead ofreacting suddenly and
even brutally to the latest story generated by the media, Wal-Mart could
report to its customers in the industrialized countries that it is taking all the
steps that the ILO, after careful study, recommends. As just noted, these
steps would include dialogue with affected workers so that Wal-Mart
understands, before acting, the likely consequences of its actions.
Wal-Mart would receive an immediate double benefit. The ILO would
provide an answer to negative publicity in the developed-country customer
market, and, so long as all multinationals conform to the minimum
standard of the top-down code, the ILO would also allow Wal-Mart and all
other multinationals to contain costs. Further, the ILO may well also
provide the multinationals the longer-term benefit of a response to the
problem of overcapacity.
By ensuring that the developing-country workers are consulted in the
implementation of the anti-child-labor norm, the ILO would be reinforcing
the enhanced good faith norm within the transnational commercial
community. The better established that enhanced norm, the less necessary
will be the supranational structure's intervention. The ILO, with the help
of the NGOs, would be modeling enhanced good faith and its extension to
the developing-country workers. For the Bangladeshi child workers, it
would have meant some income for themselves or their family and some
access to education295 instead of mass dismissal.296

294. See supra notes 8, 40, & 43 (discussing Wal-Mart, Nike and other multinationals'

response to their customer markets). See generallyPartII.A. (discussing the multinationals' concern
for the opinion of their markets).
295. See ILO/IPEC Paper, supranote 240, paras. 39,41, & 42 (providing income by part-time
work for the children, by grants, or by employing other members of the family, and providing
education, even if only on evenings and weekends).
296. In this piece, I have assumed that the anti-child-labor value is universal and have focused
on a structure to mimic an enhanced good faith norm when implementing that value. See supra
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V. CONCLUSION

The current system of weak extralegal constraints and non-existent
supranational limitations has not protected workers in developing
countries. As the Wal-Mart/Bangladesh example illustrates and the
discussion of market-driven and top-down, optional codes explains, if
multinationals are left to their own devices, they will not consistently
protect the developing-country worker. To change that reality, the
multinationals must enter into a dialogue with workers before
implementing even a universal norm against child labor. The question is
how to initiate and sustain that worker-multinational dialogue.
A supranational structure, based on the ILO, could encourage and
support the dialogue between multinationals and workers. It would not be
a mandatory code, because too much enforcement could blunt the dialogue.
Instead, the structure would provide a top-down, optional code designed
to make the dialogue maximally palatable to the multinationals. The goal
is a code conceptually based on the good faith norm that multinationals

already recognize in their dealings with each other, both in transnational
and in domestic commercial transactions. This code would enhance the
dialogic aspects of the good-faith norm that would be extended to workers.
The structure, as norm entrepreneur, would be responsible for guiding that
enhancement and extension, and would seek to reduce the multinationals'
resistance to the norm's modification by framing the change as an
advantage for the multinationals. Under this code, Wal-Mart would
ascertain the consequences of its actions before demanding that suppliers
cease employing child workers.
Once the code's new norm is firmly established in the dealings between
multinationals and workers, the transition period will be over. The hope is
that the top-down structure will work itself out of a job. While that goal
may well be optimistic,297 once the multinationals learn to hear them, the
workers' voices will at least help sustain the enhanced and extended good
faith norm.

notes 84-85, & 166. As noted above, this same structure would be available to ascertain whether
an underlying value is in fact universal. See supra text accompanying note 166.
297. It may well be too optimistic. See JONATHANBoSWELL, COmUNrrYAmDTHEECONOMY:
THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CO-OPERATION 116 (1990) (suggesting that "in complex, advanced
economies, .. . a comprehensive framework of constraints" is necessary for inclusiveness).
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